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Article

Keeping Promises and Meeting Needs:
Public Charities at a Crossroads
Allison Anna Tait †
The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep.

–Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening

Nothing can have value without being an object of utility.

–Karl Marx, Capital

When a charitable organization cannot fulfill the terms of a
charitable gift agreement, it must decide whether to keep a
promise or meet a need. That is to say, a charitable organization can either preserve original donor intent, adhering to conditions placed on a gift, or it can attempt to modify the terms of
the gift in order to budget and spend the funds more effectively.
If an institution chooses to keep a promise, it might be stuck
with a fund it cannot use because of conditions placed on the
money at the time of the gift. In order to meet needs, however,
the institution must go to court. Cy pres, the best tool available
to such an organization, is a saving doctrine that allows courts
to modify conditions placed on a charitable gift when the conditions have become either impossible or impracticable.1 What it
means, however, for a condition to be impracticable is unclear.2
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Robert Sitkoff. I also thank Erin Whelan and Blake Grady for their assistance.
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1. Cy pres derives from Norman French and means “as near,” the full
phrase being “cy pres comme possible,” or “as near as possible . . . . The fairly
common usage, ‘si pray,’ seems to be a mixture of French and English pronun-
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Courts are aware of this problem. The Iowa Supreme
Court, evaluating a cy pres claim, observed: “A review of the
case law on impossibility and impracticability has led many to
believe ‘no precise definition of the standard exists,’ and whether something has become impossible or impracticable is up to
the ‘particular facts of each case.’”3 Likewise, a Washington,
D.C. trial court judge wrote: “The [c]ourt has not found, and the
parties have not identified, any case law in this jurisdiction
that explicitly defines the term ‘impracticable’ in the cy pres
context.” 4 In addition, the judge remarked, there was “relatively little case law on this issue in other jurisdictions.” 5
Scholarship has not provided clear answers, either. Some
commentators have remarked that the standards for determining whether a trust’s terms are impractical are too high, precluding institutions from using restricted funds in ways that
would benefit both the institution and the public. 6 Other comciation.” RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ch. 22,
§ 431 (3d ed. 2017).
2. Critics have, in fact, complained for years that the cy pres doctrine is
both ambiguous and applied inconsistently by courts. Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 421, 465–66 (2005). A 1973 American Bar Association report found
that there was “significant variance in the degree of impossibility or impracticability required” by courts. Report of Committee on Charitable Trusts and
Foundations, Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in Application, 8 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 391, 398–400 (1973). Thirty years later, not much has
changed. In trust law, one scholar has remarked that, “no precise definition of
the standard exists.” McLaughlin, supra at 437. For other explorations of cy
pres, see John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2010); Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law,
21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999); Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity
Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights
into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 123 (2009); and Allison Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663
(2015).
3. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Iowa 2007) (citing
McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 465). The court concluded that cy pres was applicable when a charitable trust created to build and maintain a fountain and
garden at a certain location could no longer fulfill its terms after the city razed
the garden in order to make room for a major economic development project.
“Such a massive project should be planned in a way that maximizes its potential, and when the location of the garden and fountain jeopardize that potential it becomes impractical not to relocate them.” Id. at 557.
4. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213, 2218 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014).
5. Id.
6. Some scholars believe that the reform efforts have not been sufficient
to modernize an outdated doctrine. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to
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mentators have stated the opposite. These commentators lament a perceived judicial trend to relax the conventional
standard, observing that “policy considerations and concern for
furthering the public welfare [have become] of increasing importance in delimiting and defining the degree and type of impracticality necessary to call the cy pres doctrine into operation.” 7 Neither clarity nor consensus on how courts analyze
impracticability exists. 8
That there is no clear standard or consensus is no small
problem. The stakes are high, both in terms of dollars spent in
charitable giving, as well as the health of charitable institutions. Americans gave $389.05 billion to charitable institutions
in 2016. 9 In addition, it is estimated that by the year 2061 some
fifty-eight trillion dollars will transfer between generations.10
To be sure, not all gifts come with restrictions. But the ones
that do are generally major gifts—the ones that provide the
most significant resources to an institution. When donors restrict these gifts, they also restrict institutional flexibility because recipient institutions are obligated to adhere to such
terms—even if they become outdated or burdensome. Taken to
the extreme, gift restrictions may lead to inappropriate forms of
Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice To Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 97 (2007) [hereinafter Atkinson, The
Low Road] (stating that calls for reform, “for all their merit, have gone virtually unheeded”); see also Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1111, 1114 (1993) (proposing that charities control charitable assets rather than subjecting gifts to either donor control or state-imposed modification). See generally C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND.
L.J. 407, 414 (1979) (describing the historical development of cy pres and attempts to reform the doctrine). Vocal critics of reform also exist. See Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665
(1997). For a comparative perspective, see Peter Luxton, Cy-Pres and the
Ghost of Things That Might Have Been, 47 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 107 (1983).
7. EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 5,
§ 5.02(b) (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 1950).
8. See, e.g., Eason, supra note 2, at 125–26 (“[T]he malleability of cy pres
doctrine too often leads to outcomes that fail to predictably serve either donor
intentions or society’s interest in the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to
the public.”).
9. Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., http://www
.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018). This reflects a 4.2% increase from 2015. Id.
10. JOHN J. HAVENS & PAUL G. SCHERVISH, A GOLDEN AGE OF PHILANTHROPY STILL BECKONS: NATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFER AND POTENTIAL FOR
PHILANTHROPY TECHNICAL REPORT 5 (2014), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/
files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/A%20Golden%20Age%20of%20Philanthropy%20
Still%20Bekons.pdf.
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“donor governance,” 11 where donor control based on gift restrictions—often exerted from beyond the grave—supplants the
rightful exercise of discretion by the institutional fiduciaries. 12
An unclear cy pres standard endangers both the financial
health and the leadership authority of public charities.
The time has come to articulate a clear and usable cy pres
standard. The tools to do so are within reach, contained in the
bodies of contract and property law. The turn to these bodies of
law is apt, because trust law has roots in both contract and
property. In fact, a longstanding debate—what some have even
called a “hoary old debate” 13—exists about whether trust law is
contract or property. 14 Both contract and property have something to offer to trust law and each body of law provides an important key to unlocking the cy pres conundrum.
Contract informs trust law’s rules about keeping promises.
A guiding principle for both contract and trust law is Pacta
sunt servanda (promises must be kept). 15 Trusts, like contracts,
center on relationships, agreements, and intraparty obligations. Legal historians have therefore observed that “the distinction between trusts and contracts has not always been easily drawn.” 16 John Langbein, in The Contractarian Basis of the
Law of Trusts, has further explained the similarities between
trust and contract law, particularly in the modern context of fiduciary duty and institutional trusteeship. Langbein states:
11. David Yermack, Donor Governance and Financial Management in
Prominent U.S. Art Museums 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 21066, Apr. 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21066.pdf (“Restricted
donations represent a form of corporate governance, because they constrain
the opportunities for non-profit managers to expropriate resources. I call this
practice ‘donor governance,’ and it permits benefactors to influence a nonprofit for decades, even after they may have severed all connections or died.”).
12. Id.
13. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 471 (1998).
14. See id.; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995); Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory
of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 628–31 (2004).
15. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 311 (2009) (“Almost all cases in Chancery can be reduced to this
simple formula, and the answer of conscience was as simple: promises have to
be kept—pacta sunt servanda . . . .” (citing Franz Metzger, The Last Phase of
the Medieval Chancery, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 79, 84 (Alan Harding ed., 1980))).
16. Neil G. Jones, Aspects of Privity in England: Equity to 1680, in IUS
QUAESITUM TERTIO 135, 162 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 2008).
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“[T]he deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract.” 17
The result: “Trusts are contracts.” 18
But trust law is also property law. In fact, “[w]e are accustomed to think of the trust as a branch of property law.” 19 This
connection between trust and property has persisted because,
while the relationship may contain a contract between trustee
and settlor, a trust cannot be formed without property—an asset to be held and managed in trust. For this reason, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts said: “The creation of a trust is
conceived of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the
trust property rather than as a contract.” 20 Property and trust
both focus on the thing, or res, in trust, as well as its protection
and efficient use. From property law, trust law inherits a set of
rules and concerns about maximizing the value and the utility
of a managed asset. Property rules are about productive use,
obtaining a reasonable return, and meeting needs.
This Article draws on both contract and property theory in
order to enable a better understanding of trust law and what
the standard for impracticability should be. Part I briefly describes the history and current status of cy pres in trust law. I
offer three cy pres case studies that demonstrate how trust law
is caught between contract and property, lacking guidance on
how to identify and deploy various practical factors, doctrinal
directives, and theoretical concepts. Part II begins with an exploration of the historical connections between trust, contract,
and property, uncovering the conceptual ties between the bodies of law. I then analyze contract and property doctrines that
bear on trust law’s impracticability question. I focus first on
commercial impracticability cases that demonstrate contract
law’s high premium on both keeping promises and bargaining. I
then explore property law rules—easements by necessity and
variances—to reveal the premium the rules place on efficient
use of property and the notion of reasonable return. In Part III,
I propose a revised standard for cy pres impracticability, drawing on both contract and property law, and explain why a new
hybrid rule is theoretically apposite.

17.
18.
19.
20.
1959).

Langbein, supra note 14, at 627 (1995).
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
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Ultimately, both contract and property can help craft a cy
pres doctrine that balances institutional obligation and need,
while the inquiry into contract and property provides a new
and helpful aperture through which to better assess the nature
of trust law itself.
I. DILEMMAS IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
Historically, courts have used cy pres to modify gift conditions and trust terms when the purpose becomes obsolete or exceedingly outdated. 21 Cy pres modifications remedy valueimpairing conditions placed on gifts, correct inefficiencies and
complications associated with dead-hand control, and recalibrate the equilibrium between donor control and public benefit. 22 Broadly construed, cy pres is a delicate balancing act between keeping promises and using property efficiently. In this
way, the cy pres doctrine is also a balancing act between the
normative goals of contract and property. In this Part, I provide
an overview of the cy pres doctrine prior to analyzing three recent cases that demonstrate how nonprofit institutions can be
handicapped by unclear trust standards of impracticability.
A. TRUST LAW AND THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
According to the cy pres doctrine, a court can modify the
terms of a charitable trust or restricted charitable gift (the doctrine does not apply to private trusts 23) if the trust terms have
become impossible to achieve or impracticable to perform. 24 The
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) adds that “the doctrines of cy pres
21. Tait, supra note 2, at 1681.
22. For example, one court modified gift terms on a fund that provided a
baked potato at each meal for each young woman at Bryn Mawr College. Julius Rosenwald, Principles of Public Giving, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1929, at
601.
23. Private trusts can be changed using the Claflin doctrine or administrative/equitable deviation. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES LINDGRIN, & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILL, TRUSTS & ESTATES 759–60 (10th ed.).
24. Cy pres may also be judicially applied when the terms are unlawful or
wasteful. Drafters of the UTC added the category of wasteful in 2000 and
wasteful entered into the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in 2003. The Restatement defines wasteful as meaning that the funds far exceed what is necessary, rendering it imprudent not to expand the purposes for which the funds
can be applied. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). I
discuss impracticability (and impossibility, to a lesser degree) and not wastefulness because of the similarities that exist between cy pres impracticability
and doctrines in both contract and property law. I therefore set aside the question of wastefulness for another venue and time.
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and deviation apply to funds held by nonprofit corporations as
well as to funds held by charitable trusts.” 25 Similarly, the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act
(UPMIFA) permits the use of cy pres as a tool for modifying restrictions placed on any nonprofit institutional funds.26 Cy
pres, therefore, has a wide reach and potential application for
any nonprofit organization that holds restricted funds, including major universities, hospitals, and museums.
To begin the cy pres process, the trustees or directors of a
charitable institution must file a petition seeking judicial modification. Generally, the fiduciaries and parties with a special
interest are the only ones with standing to seek such modifications. 27 The general rule, relayed for example in UPMIFA, is
that the trustees or directors also “shall notify the [Attorney
General] of the application, and the [Attorney General] must be
given an opportunity to be heard.” 28 Once the petition has been
filed, courts apply a multipart test to evaluate whether cy pres
is appropriate. In the absence of contravening language in the
trust itself, courts must determine that (1) a valid charitable
trust exists; and (2) the trust’s purpose is illegal, impractical,
25. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note
at 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006). The comment to UTC section 413 states that:
“ The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, but also to other types of
charitable dispositions, including those to charitable corporations.” UNIF. TR.
CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
26. UPMIFA section 6(c) states:
If a particular charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a gift
instrument on the use of an institutional fund becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the court, upon application of an institution, may modify the purpose of the fund or the restriction on the use of the fund in a manner consistent with the
charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2006). Forty-nine states as well as the District of Columbia and the
U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted the UPMIFA as of 2018. Legislative Fact
Sheet—Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20
Management%20of%20Institutional%20Funds%20Act (last visited Apr. 12,
2018). UPMIFA applies primarily to funds held by charities organized as nonprofit corporations. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT 1
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).
27. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 782 (discussing the problem of
standing with respect to the enforcement of charitable trusts); see also Evelyn
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1197–1206 (2007) (detailing which
parties have standing under common law charitable trust doctrine).
28. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2006).
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impossible, or wasteful. 29 If these conditions are met, the court
has the power to modify the terms of the trust, as long as the
modifications are in alignment with the donor’s original intent.
The common law doctrine provides “that equity will . . . substitute another charitable object which is believed to approach the
original purpose as closely as possible.” 30 The UTC has softened
this requirement somewhat, stating that the court may apply
cy pres by directing that the trust property “be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the
settlor’s charitable purposes.” 31
A dispositive question, then, for proceeding to cy pres analysis is whether gift terms are either impossible or impracticable. Courts have not clearly differentiated between impracticability and impossibility. Pressed to articulate a difference,
courts have traditionally interpreted impossible quite literally,
meaning that the object of funding has ceased to exist. For example, a gift dedicated to curing polio is faced with an impossible application of funds because the disease has been eliminated. A gift to an institution that subsequently merges with
another one or otherwise ceases to exist in its original form is

29. The current version of the UTC presumes general charitable intent,
unlike the previous versions. In states that have not adopted the UTC, fiduciaries also have to prove that the donor had general charitable intent. See
UNIF. TR. CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Subsection (a), which is similar to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 . . . modifies the doctrine of cy pres
by presuming that the settlor had a general charitable intent when a particular charitable purpose becomes impossible or impracticable to achieve. Traditional doctrine did not supply that presumption, leaving it to the courts to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable intent.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). This formulation has been
widely adopted by courts as well. See, e.g., Kolb v. City of Storm Lake,
736 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Iowa 2007).
30. RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES ch. 22,
§ 431 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis added).
31. UNIF. TR. CODE § 413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (emphasis added). A
comment to section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that the
modified purpose “need not be the nearest possible but one reasonably similar
or close to the settlor ’s designated purpose.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 67 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003). This relaxes the previous standard, which
was that courts must generally seek a purpose that conforms to the donor ’s
objective “as nearly as possible.” In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift,
261 P.3d 800, 809 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) (citing 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 157
(2011)). UPMIFA section 6(c) states that the proposed modification be “in a
manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift instrument.” UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2006).
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similarly impossible to administer. 32 In a recent New York
case, the court found a gift to a hospital that had “ceased operating as a hospital, modified its corporate name and changed
its corporate function to promoting health and well-being” was
subject to cy pres modification because circumstances rendered
the gift terms impossible to satisfy as written. 33 This standard
of impossibility is embodied in some state statutes, such as
Rhode Island’s, which provides, in relevant part, that
“[a]pplication of the cy pres doctrine, under Rhode Island law,
is limited to circumstances where the purposes of a donor cannot be literally carried into effect.” 34 Impossibility, therefore,
generally provides “relief only on a narrow set of grounds,” 35 in
the face of changed circumstances that bring about a clear frustration of the original purpose.
The standard for impracticability is less extreme and also
less clear. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that “[t]he
doctrine of cy pres may also be applied, even though it is possible to carry out the particular purpose of the settlor, if to do so
would not accomplish the settlor’s charitable objective, or
would not do so in a reasonable way.” 36 The impracticability
standard, therefore, recognizes and acknowledges that circumstances may arise in which the trust terms cannot be carried
out without substantial burden to the institution or substantial
impairment of the charitable purpose. 37 In practice, however,
this standard does not always provide sufficient clarity for
courts trying to determine what kinds of conditions unduly
burden institutions and impair donor intent.

32. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 101–02 (“ The cy pres doctrine harbors no
criterion by which to evaluate the continued social efficacy of a nondiscriminatory restricted gift short of showing that its object ceased to exist.”).
33. In re Lally, 112 A.D.3d 1099, 1101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The court
reformed the terms of the trust and directed the funds to the institution that
“assumed all responsibility for the hospital and related healthcare services
previously provided by [the former hospital].” Id.
34. 18 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (1956).
35. Goodwin, supra note 2, at 101.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
37. 15 AM. JUR. 2D § 151 (2011) (citing insufficiency of funds as one reason
why it may be difficult to accomplish the charitable purpose of a gift); Mark
Dennison, Circumstances Warranting Application of Cy Pres Doctrine To Modify Terms of Charitable Trust, in 88 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 469, 496 § 10
(2006) (“A purpose becomes impracticable when the application of [trust] property to such purpose would not accomplish the general charitable intention of
the settlor.”).
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A Hawaiian state appellate court decision, In re Elizabeth
J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 38 exemplifies a relatively broad
judicial interpretation of the impracticability standard. In that
case, the donor gifted interest in a parcel of land to the Hawaiian Humane Society, with the restriction that the property “be
used for the benefit of the public for the operation of an educational preserve for flora and fauna.” 39 The Humane Society
made “numerous attempts” to use the land within the parameters established by the gift deed. 40 However, the State of Hawaii determined that the land was mostly unsuitable for use as
a public park 41 and all possible plans were ultimately rejected
as “physically or economically unfeasible.” 42 The Humane Society finally brokered a deal to exchange one small, usable part of
the land to the State and to sell the rest to a private partnership.43 The funds would be put toward environmental stewardship programming.44 The appellate court concluded that cy pres
was applicable “where a settlor creates a charitable trust of real property to be used for a particular purpose, but the property
turns out to be unsuitable for that purpose.” 45
Impracticability represents a lower threshold than impossibility—compliance is not technically impossible but, rather,
impossible without the recipient institution taking on an excessive burden. Impracticability combines notions of the unworkable, the inefficient, and the unaffordable. There is no consistent
standard, however, for what constitutes hardship or excessive

38. 261 P.3d 800, 807 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
39. Id. at 803.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 812.
42. Id. at 803.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 804. In order to effectuate the deal, the Humane Society filed a
petition with the probate court, requesting a modification of the gift terms. Id.
The probate court concluded that the gift terms were not capable of being modified through the use of cy pres because an alternative use had been identified
in the gift deed. Id. at 805.
45. Id. at 807 (citing Roberds v. Markham, 81 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.D.C.
1948)) (recognizing that courts may order sale of gifted land if conditions have
drastically changed or land otherwise becomes unsuitable for its dedicated
purpose); see Bd. of Educ. v. City of Rockford, 24 N.E.2d 366, 369–73 (Ill. 1939)
(applying cy pres to allow sale of land in charitable trust where its dedicated
use as school became impracticable due to shifting populations, deterioration
of existing building, and existence of another school that met needs of the area); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 39.5.2, at 2724–25 (4th ed. 1988).
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burden, and courts are left to speculate while public charities
try to navigate troubled financial waters.
B. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS IN DISTRESS
Recent cy pres cases confirm that the cy pres standard is
inconsistent and hard to pin down. In this Section, I discuss
three cases and explore how doctrinal inconsistency may be
harming charitable organizations more than it is helping. In
certain cases, like the Corcoran Gallery case, a good result for
the institution ensues and the institution benefits from new
forms of flexibility. In other cases, such as the Girard College
and Sweet Briar cases, cy pres may not be available to the institution and there is, consequently, no clear path out of financial difficulties.
1. The Corcoran Gallery: The Desperation Standard
One of the most recent and highly publicized cy pres cases
involved the closing of the Corcoran Gallery, and the takeover
of its assets and functions by the National Gallery of Art (NGA)
and the George Washington University (GWU). The case, The
Trustees of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 46 turned on questions of financial hardship and the possibilities available to the Corcoran Gallery for raising money.
The Corcoran was established in 1869 through a deed of
trust executed by William Wilson Corcoran.47 The goal of the
trust was to fund an institution in Washington D.C. that was
“dedicated to Art, and used solely for the purpose of encouraging American Genius.”48 The deed of trust also created a board
of trustees and vested them with general management authority of the institution.49 In the following decade, the trustees established Corcoran College, “which was integrated into the
overall institution and which emphasized student access to the
art collection.” 50
A little over a century after the Corcoran was created,
however, the institution’s financial condition began to deteriorate. 51 The court found that, since 2001, the Corcoran had ex46. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014).
47. Id. at 2214.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2215.

1800

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1789

perienced significant budget problems and had “been operating
at a deficit for . . . the majority of the last thirteen years.” 52 The
Corcoran was struggling to make payments on loans that were
in default and to meet even basic payroll obligations. 53 Furthermore, even though the Corcoran had net assets of more
than seventy-three million dollars, only four million dollars of
these assets were unrestricted, giving the trustees little flexibility within the budget to cover emergency expenses or reorganize spending. 54
In an attempt to decrease operating expenses, the Trustees had voted
to decrease staff and had deferred necessary building maintenance. 55
Deferred maintenance, however, raised questions about the building’s
capacity to house the art as well as the College. 56 A report from consultants stated that the building’s old systems were “not capable of
reliably maintaining museum-level exhibit and conservation standards.” 57

Seeking a way out of this financial distress, the trustees
filed a cy pres petition, 58 requesting that the court permit the
Corcoran to be subsumed jointly into GWU and the NGA. GWU
would establish a new school for art and design, incorporating
the Corcoran College students into this new school. The NGA
would acquire the bulk of the artwork and establish a “new
contemporary art program, incorporating the Corcoran
name.” 59 The threshold question before the court was whether
the trustees had “established that it [was] impracticable to car-

52. Id. at 2220.
53. Id. at 2215.
54. Id. at 2221.
55. Id. at 2215.
56. Id. at 2221.
57. Id. Because of these problems, the college’s accreditation was at stake.
Id. at 2215. The commission charged with reaccreditation reported that: “ The
College lacks the resources to operate much beyond the next academic
year . . . . Most of our negative evaluation judgments are about standards that
are directly affected by dwindling resources.” Id.
58. See D.C. CODE § 19-1304.13 (2004) (“Except as otherwise provided in
the terms of the trust, if a particular charitable purpose is or becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful: (1) The trust does not
fail, in whole or in part; (2) The trust property does not revert to the settlor or
the settlor ’s successors in interest; and (3) The court may apply cy pres to
modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or
distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor ’s charitable purposes.”).
59. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014).
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ry out the [d]eed of [t]rust that created the Corcoran given the
Corcoran’s current financial condition.” 60
Regarding the question of impracticability, the court could
find no relevant cy pres case law, in its own jurisdiction or
elsewhere. 61 The court added that the legislative history of the
Uniform Trust Act “does not elucidate this issue.” 62 Because of
this relative lack of guidance, the court turned to contract law
and commercial impracticability to gain new insights:
In the contract context, the Court of Appeals has defined “impracticable” to mean that a party is excused from performing its obligations
under a contract due to an unexpected contingency only if that contingency causes the party “extreme or unreasonable difficulty” in performing its obligations under the contract, and not if the contingency
is “a mere inconvenience or unexpected difficulty.” 63

The court concluded that “a party seeking cy pres relief can
establish impracticability only if it demonstrates that it would
be unreasonably difficult, and that it is not viable or feasible, to
carry out the current terms and conditions of the trust.” 64
A group called Save the Corcoran, intervening to block the
cy pres petition, argued that the Corcoran could raise funds
through a major deaccessioning effort, as well as increased
fundraising.65 The intervenors proposed that the Corcoran sell
more than 17,000 pieces from the collection, and that the funds
from these sales could bridge the budgetary gap. 66 The court,
however, found compelling evidence that the Corcoran would
face sanctions from the American Association of Museum Directors (AAMD) if deaccessioning money were to be spent on
60. Id. at 2213. The second question was, if impracticable, whether “the
plan proposed by the Trustees [is] as near as possible to the intent of William
Wilson Corcoran when he established the Trust.” Id. I discuss the first question here, and the question of donor intent is addressed in the following section. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. Id. at 2218 (noting that neither the court nor the parties have identified case law explicitly defining impracticable in the court’s jurisdiction and
little case law exists in other jurisdictions on the issue). The court did find
that “the D.C. Circuit has noted that a party fails to establish impossibility or
impracticability when it seeks to modify a charitable trust ‘merely because it
suits its own convenience to do so.’” Id. (quoting Conn. Coll. v. United States,
276 F.2d 491, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Island Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 933 A.2d 340,
350 (D.C. 2007)).
64. Id. at 2219.
65. Id. at 2221 (“Intervenors have argued that the Corcoran can address
this shortfall of funds both by selling some of the more than 17,000 pieces in
the Corcoran’s collection and by increasing its fundraising efforts.”).
66. Id.
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operating costs. 67 These sanctions, the court observed, could be
“painful” and produce “substantial risks” for the institution, because the gallery would not be able to host traveling exhibitions
or receive loans from other AAMD accredited museums. 68 Sanctions, including loss of accreditation, would also make it difficult for the Corcoran to retain high-quality curatorial staff and
could disqualify the gallery from receiving federal grants and
other funds. 69
The intervenors argued that a new fundraising program
could bring the Corcoran back to financial health and stability. 70 The court was equally skeptical of this proposition. Indeed, the court noted that even the intervenor’s own witnesses
acknowledged that “fundraising campaigns take significant
time to plan and execute” and that the planning period alone
for a capital campaign was several years, followed by the multiyear campaign. 71 The court mentioned that, in the past, “the
Corcoran’s fundraising department has been plagued by vacancies and high staff turnover” that would make the job of building a top-rate board difficult. 72 The court also remarked that
global recession had made fundraising difficult even in the best
of circumstances. 73
Crediting a report that stated the Corcoran board was
“working tirelessly . . . to come to terms with the institution’s
significant financial challenges and to identify creative solutions,” 74 the court concluded that the trustees had not only established their own good faith, but also that the Corcoran’s circumstances were indeed impracticable. Severe financial
distress combined with a paucity of plausible alternatives persuaded the court that the hardship was sufficiently severe to
merit cy pres application. 75 Consequently, the result was a good
67. Id. (discussing the possibility of sanctions).
68. Id. at 2221–22. For more on the regulation of deaccessioning, and the
problems with the current framework, see Allison Tait, Publicity Rules for
Public Trusts, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421 (2015).
69. Trs. of the Corcoran Gallery of Art v. District of Columbia, 142 Daily
Wash. L. Rptr. 2213, 2215 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014).
70. Id. at 2221.
71. Id. The fundraising consultants proposed increasing donations
through “better ‘Board-building’ practices,” which the court found speculative
at best. Id.
72. Id. at 2222.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 2215–23 (discussing the court’s reasoning for finding the
“first requirement for cy pres relief ” was met).
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one for the Corcoran, releasing it from the strictures imposed
by the original deed of trust. Nevertheless, the bar the court established for relief was a high one—the threat of institutional
failure and financial insolvency. Had the Corcoran Gallery not
been facing imminent failure and shuttering, it is not clear that
the court would have reached the same decision.
2. Girard College: Is the Hardship Permanent?

Following the Corcoran case, the question of hardship
arose again in In re Estate of Girard, requiring a Pennsylvania
court to press further into what constitutes a sufficient showing
of need. The case was not as clear-cut as it was with the Corcoran and, consequently, the court was not as sympathetic to the
plaintiff institution.
The Girard will—called by the trial court the “most litigated will in history” 76—memorialized the last wishes of Stephen
Girard. In this will, Girard left the majority of his “considerable
estate” to be used to educate the poor and improve their circumstances: “I am particularly desirous to provide for such a
number of poor male white orphan children, as can be trained
in one institution, a better education, as well as a more comfortable maintenance, than they usually receive from the application of public funds.” 77 The will stipulated that these needy
students be “fed . . . clothed . . . and lodged in a plain but safe
manner.” 78
Over the years, Girard College fiduciaries had successfully
sought judicial permission for various deviations, including the
admission of women, students of color, and children with one
living parent.79 In 2013, however, the Girard College Board of
Directors (Girard College Board) sought permission to deviate
from the terms of the will by eliminating the boarding function
76. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 1,
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree (quoting Hershel Shanks, State Action
and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (1956)). The will was the
subject of multiple cases, starting as early as 1844. In fact, the 1844 case of
Vidal v. Girard’s Executors was the case that established the validity of the
charitable trust in American law. See Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 196
(1844). For a discussion of the case, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Girard Will
Case: Charity and Inheritance in the City of Brotherly Love, in PHILANTHROPY
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: SELECTED PAPERS 1 (Jack Salzman ed., 1987).
77. In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d 623, 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
78. Id.
79. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 17,
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree.
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because of financial hardship. 80 The college’s funding derived
from coal revenue, rental income, and interest on a residuary
fund. 81 The Girard College Board alleged that there had been a
decrease in revenue produced from all these sources due to the
economic crisis of 2008.82 The Girard College Board stated that
the available income was “insufficient to fund the financial requirements of the college, requiring shortfalls to be funded by
the use of Trust principal.” 83 Moreover, the Girard College
Board claimed that, in the absence of change, the residuary
fund “would be exhausted within 25 years.” 84
Like the Corcoran trustees, the Girard College Board detailed the steps it had taken to address the budget shortfalls.
The Girard College Board stated it had “significantly reduced
expenses” by reducing the student population, and had reduced
the college’s debt through refinancing.85 Furthermore, the
Girard College Board had decided to defer certain maintenance
repairs, including “$3.8 million for deficiency repairs and in excess of $110 million for complete renovations.” 86 In an effort to
cut costs, the Girard College Board also “froze raises and the
defined benefit retirement plan for administrative employees.” 87
The Girard College Board created a strategic steering
committee to review proposals for long-term solutions to the
college’s financial problems. 88 The steering committee’s recommendation was that the residential program was too costly and
that it should be suspended, at least temporarily, “given the financial limitations and conditions of the physical plant.” 89 The
college could then focus on a nonresidential program for grades
one through eight, consolidating those grades into the lower
school building, which would still require four million dollars in
80. The Girard College Board sought to make these changes via both administrative deviation and cy pres. See In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d at 631
(listing the issues raised by the Girard College Board).
81. Id. at 626.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id. at 626.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 626–27 (internal quotations omitted).
87. Orphans’ Ct. Op. Sur Decree, Aug. 21, 2014 (Orphans’ Ct. Op.) at 10,
https://z.umn.edu/OrphansCtDecree.
88. See In re Estate of Girard, 132 A.3d at 627.
89. Id. The steering committee also presented the Board with the “Girard
College Growback Framework and Transition Initiatives.” Id. The goal was to
grow the residuary fund back to $350 million in ten years. Id.
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renovations.90 Based on these recommendations, the Girard
College Board requested in its cy pres petition to “temporarily
modify the provisions of the Will to allow the elimination of the
residential program and instead provide an extended day program.” 91
In court, defining what sounded like impossibility rather
than impracticability, the judges stated that “the cy pres doctrine cannot be invoked until it is clearly established that the
directions of the donor cannot be carried into effect.” 92 The
court also focused on the temporary nature of the problem. The
court noted that the Orphans’ Court found it significant, and
they did not disagree, “that the Board does not represent that
the residential aspect of Girard or the high school are permanently impracticable” and, due to market upturns, the college
was in a position to “cover the projected budget for the college
for the coming year, operating with both a residential program
and a high school.” 93 Looking only at one year was deceptive,
the Board claimed, because it did not take into account “necessary infrastructure improvements,” tenancy loss in some of the
college’s real estate holdings, or “an increase in capital expenditures for properties held in the Estate’s real estate portfolio.” 94
The Girard College Board contended that the appropriate question was “whether the Estate will have sufficient financial resources to operate Girard College in perpetuity, as Stephen
Girard desired.” 95 This argument, however, did not persuade
the court. 96
The problems with the judicial decision were many. The
court never articulated a standard for evaluating cy pres based
on impracticability. This absence of a standard allowed the
court to reject the cy pres petition simply because of the per90. Id. (noting that “[u]nder the proposal, grades 1 through 8 would be
consolidated in the lower school buildings, which were the newest buildings on
campus” but even so, “[f ]our million dollars in renovations to the lower school
buildings would be necessary”).
91. Id. at 626.
92. Id. at 629, 637 (noting the Orphans’ Court conclusion and affirming its
holding).
93. Id. at 629–30, 634.
94. Id. at 635.
95. Id. (“By limiting the scope of its review to 2013 and 2014, the Orphans’ Court failed to appreciate the critical financial challenges facing the
Estate that inevitably will lead to an inability to continue operating the College as an educational institution.”).
96. Id. at 636 (stating that the Girard College Board’s arguments from a
fact and law argument lack merit and do not support reversal).
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ceived temporary nature of the college’s problems. The court focused on the college being able to operate for one year, implying
that normal operations were not impossible, thereby confusing
the impossible and impracticable standards. A cy pres analysis
centered on impracticability rather than impossibility might
have focused on the long-term sustainability of the college and
balanced donor intent with the burden to the institution created by donor conditions.
Equally problematic, in denying the cy pres petition, the
court substituted its judgment about strategic planning and the
exercise of discretion for the Girard College Board’s. The steering committee’s findings and the Girard College Board’s
knowledge of the college’s financial situation both suggested
that the college’s then-current operations were not sustainable,
given declining revenue coupled with rising operational expenses. The court, however, denied the Girard College Board
the opportunity to exercise discretion and control in governing
the institution. This rejection of the Girard College Board’s discretion runs contrary to powers attributed to fiduciaries in, for
example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which states: “A
court will not interfere with a trustee’s exercise of a discretionary power (or decision not to exercise the power) when that
conduct is reasonable, not based on an improper interpretation
of the terms of the trust, and not otherwise inconsistent with
the trustee’s fiduciary duties.” 97
Ultimately, then, the court declined to approve any modifications based on the Girard College Board’s projections because
of an uncertain standard that confused impossible with impracticable. The Girard College Board, consequently, was denied
the ability to properly exercise its judgment as a fiduciary and
use its institutional expertise to govern the institution. Modification, in this case, was not available as a means to further institutional strategic planning or help improve the college’s position prospectively because the financial situation was not
sufficiently dire.
3. Sweet Briar College: A Case Study in Donor Governance
This need for discretionary latitude in governance flexibility was apparent in the recent near-failure of Sweet Briar College. Sweet Briar opened its doors in 1906, founded with a bequest from Indiana Fletcher Williams, a wealthy Virginia
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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woman.98 Williams left all her “plantation and a tract of land
known as Sweet Briar Plantation” for the purposes of forming
“a school or seminary for the education of white girls and young
women” in memory of her deceased daughter, Daisy.99 From
the time of its opening onward, Sweet Briar remained a women’s college dedicated to preparing young women to “be useful
members of society.” 100
Suddenly and without warning, Sweet Briar College’s
Board of Directors (Sweet Briar Board) announced in March
2015 that the college would be closing its doors at the end of the
academic year because of financial difficulties. 101 President of
the college, James F. Jones Jr., stated that “two key realities”
had become inalterable obstacles to the college’s financial sustainability: “the declining number” of women selecting to attend single-sex institutions, as well as “the increase in the tuition discount rate” that the college was extending to each new
class of incoming students. 102 From 2009 to 2015, enrollment
had dropped from 611 students to 561; at the same time, the
discount rate had increased from 48.9% to 61.9% for first year
students. 103 The Sweet Briar Board also reported that deferred
maintenance expenses “were a factor in its decision to close.” 104
In an effort to control expenses, the college suspended all
retirement contributions on behalf of employees for five
months, the president worked for two weeks without pay, and a
small number of administrative and support staff positions
were eliminated. 105
98. About: History, SWEET BRIAR COLL., http://sbc.edu/about/history (last
visited Apr. 12, 2018).
99. INTERNET ARCHIVE, WILL OF INDIANA FLETCHER WILLIAMS 2–4,
https://www.archive.org/stream/willofindianafle00unse#page/n5/mode/2up
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
100. Id.
101. Christy Jackson, Board of Directors Votes To Close College at the End
of 2014–2015 Academic Year, SWEET BRIAR COLL. (Mar. 4, 2015), http://sbc
.edu/news/board-of-directors-votes-to-close-college-at-the-end-of-2014-2015
-academic-year.
102. Id.
103. Scott Jaschik, Shocking Decision at Sweet Briar, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/04/sweet-briar
-college-will-shut-down.
104. John T. Casteen, Learning from Sweet Briar, ASSOC. OF GOVERNING
BOARDS (2015), http://agb.org/trusteeship/2015/julyaugust/learning-from
-sweet-briar.
105. Scott Jaschik, The Price of an Enrollment Shortfall, INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/11/30/
sweetbriar.
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At the time that the Sweet Briar Board announced the
closing, however, the college’s endowment was valued at approximately eighty-five million dollars. 106 Moreover, the endowment value, with some negligible fluctuation, had held
steady since 2009. 107 The Sweet Briar Board chair therefore
remarked in an interview that he knew one particular question
was on the minds of many: “Why don’t you keep going until the
lights go out?” 108 The total value of the endowment was, nevertheless, a misleading figure. According to Standard and Poor’s,
only about one-fourth of the endowment funds were unrestricted. 109 The restricted funds could not be used for general operations or as needed by college leadership, thereby rendering the
college’s financial situation bleaker than the endowment value
alone suggested. Despite the endowment value, the college was
projecting a two million dollar deficit in 2015 and owed creditors about twenty-five million dollars.110 One retired college
president explained: “[The endowment is] not like a cookie jar
that Sweet Briar can use to cover increasing deficits year after
year.” 111
One solution would have been for the college to modify
conditions placed on restricted endowed funds through cy pres.
Lifting restrictions on potentially three-fourths of the endowment—upward of sixty million dollars—could only have helped
the college navigate its financial straits. The process might
have been burdensome, petitioning for cy pres modifications on
each restricted fund. Nevertheless, the option was there for the
Sweet Briar Board as its members sought strategic ways to increase disposable, unrestricted income.
Instead, the Sweet Briar Board addressed another cy pres
question: what to do with the college assets during and after
the school’s closure. One month after announcing the closure,
college administrators sent letters to living donors requesting
permission to use restricted endowed funds for “general charitable purposes . . . including costs that the Sweet Briar Board
(or a committee acting on its behalf) determines are necessary
and proper to effect the closure of the college and winding up of
106. Jaschik, supra note 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ry Rivard, Who Gets the Endowment?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Mar. 5,
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/05/where-will-sweet
-briars-85m-endowment-go.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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its affairs.” 112 An outraged alumnae group quickly mobilized
and responded by requesting an injunction that would prevent
the college from using any donor funds in service of closing the
school.113 Before litigation could get too far, however, the parties reached a settlement and an infusion of cash from alumnae
allowed Sweet Briar to keep its doors open. 114 As part of the
settlement, the state attorney general agreed to lift restrictions
on sixteen million dollars in the college’s endowment fund. 115
Left unanswered were questions about how the court
would have treated any cy pres claims if the Sweet Briar Board
had pursued modifications instead of settling with the alumnae. Whether the Sweet Briar Board had asked to lift restrictions to continue operating, or, alternately, to proceed with
the closure, it is possible that a court evaluating the school’s finances might have been inclined to reject the petitions because
of the relatively robust endowment fund that existed. Sweet
Briar was not in the immediate financial crisis that the Corcoran was when the trustees submitted their cy pres petition.
Sweet Briar looked more like Girard College than the Corcoran
in that the present crisis was based on future predictions of unsustainable finances caused, in part, by restricted gifts. And,
similar to the Girard case, these restrictions on endowed funds
had created a system of donor governance that hampered
Sweet Briar’s leadership from fulfilling fiduciary duties and
exercising strategic control over college operations. 116 But,
112. Complaint at 41, Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst.,
No. 15009373 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015).
113. Id. at 3. The alumnae group argued that all donor contributions—
including college property and land given by Indiana Williams—were subject
to trust rules and had to be treated as charitable gifts. Id. The alumnae group
based their argument concerning Williams’ founding gift on the fact that Indiana Williams’ bequest provided for the perpetual existence of Sweet Briar and
stated: “No part of the [donated land] shall at any time be sold or alienated by
the corporation . . . [and] the personal property herein given shall be kept inviolate as an endowment fund . . . .” Id. at 16. The question of whether trust
rules could apply to the college as a nonprofit corporation went to the Virginia
Supreme Court and the conclusion was that trust law could indeed apply.
Commonwealth ex rel. Bowyer v. Sweet Briar Inst., No. 150619, 2015 WL
3646914, at *2 (Va. June 9, 2015).
114. Scott Jaschik, Sweet Briar Survives, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 22,
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/22/deal-will-save-sweet
-briar-college.
115. Id.
116. David Yermack, Donor Governance and Financial Management in
Prominent US Art Museums, 41 J. CULTURAL ECON. 215, 216 (2017) (discussing how donor restrictions “limit operating flexibility in a way that could com-
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without additional evidence of imminent failure, a court may
not have been convinced that cy pres modification was appropriate as a means of solving Sweet Briar’s financial predicament.
As the Corcoran, Girard, and Sweet Briar cases all demonstrate, income flexibility is critical when institutions are in financial distress, whether the distress is caused by decreased
government funding, increased operational costs, or endowment erosion. And in all cases, gift restrictions hampered the
ability of institutional fiduciaries to fulfill their duties to the
institution by undertaking creative solutions to financial problems. Without a clear standard for cy pres in the context of financial hardship, institutions like Sweet Briar and Girard will
continue to find themselves in an unenviable position, unable
to either use gift funds or escape from the gift restrictions until
their position is one of financial desperation like the Corcoran.
As one commentator has noted, “Boards at other institutions will face issues not unlike the ones Sweet Briar is facing
now.” 117 A confused impracticability standard will leave these
institutional leaders without the ability to exercise their best
judgment in administering institutional assets during the
times when managerial expertise and flexibility are most needed.
II. TRUST LAW’S BALANCING ACT
In the search for a more consistent cy pres standard, contract and property law are both effective tools for rebuilding
trust law. Trust law shares important architectural features
with both contract and property law, resembling each in certain
doctrinal ways and replicating both in conceptual terms. Contract law offers lessons in promise keeping and agreement
compliance. Property law, on the other hand, evidences a
strong concern for meeting needs through the productive use of
assets. This Part analyzes how contract and property doctrines
address questions analogous to those posed in the cy pres context and how those doctrines resolve the questions.

promise an organization’s efficiency . . . because they constrain the opportunities for non-profit managers to expropriate resources”).
117. Casteen, supra note 104.

2018]

KEEPING PROMISES

1811

A. RULES FOR KEEPING PROMISES
Contract law is the only other body of law with an actual
doctrine of impracticability, and it shares many qualities with
the trust law doctrine. For this reason alone, an inquiry into
the relationship between contract and trust is warranted. The
trust and contract law comparison is also appropriate because
the two bodies of law share theoretical underpinnings. This
Section explores the historical connection between trust and
contract, and then analyzes the contract doctrine of impracticability.
1. The Trust-Contract Connection
Trust and contract law are built around similar conceptual
puzzles concerning how agreements are made, what promises
must be kept, and what the default rules of obligation are. In
the following discussion, I explore the similarities between
trust and contract law, paying particular attention to the status of charitable trusts and gifts.
a. Making the Historical Connection

Trust law shares a conceptual relationship with contract
law because both bodies of law have historically carried with
them the idea of agreement and obligation. Maitland, writing
in the early 1900s, observed that “when the English Chancellor
first began to enforce the trust, the trust ‘generally ha[d] its
origin in something that we can not but call an agreement.’” 118
Maitland also observed that “[the] trust was originally regarded as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not usually so called.” 119 Likewise, Holdsworth wrote, “Chancellors carried with them into the court of Chancery the idea that faith
should be kept; and enforced agreements, . . . whenever they
thought that in the interests of good faith and honest dealing,
they ought to be enforced.” 120 A guiding principle in Chancery,

118. Langbein, supra note 17, at 628. Langbein states: “Sensitivity to the
contractarian character of the trust can be traced to Maitland’s celebrated lectures on Equity, published posthumously in 1909.” Id.
119. Id.
120. WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456
(1922). See also W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH
EQUITY 166 (1914) (discussing that there is “a moral duty” to fulfill promises
and that such promises should be enforced).
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the site of all trust litigation, was pacta sunt servanda (promises must be kept). 121
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, legal scholars and commentators posited that trust claims could
be categorized as either property or contract claims. 122 And
while the majority of commentators pressed the property law
connection, scholars like Henry Ballow made attempts to further the analogy between trust and contract law. Ballow identified the trust “as a species of contract” 123 and the analogy between trust and contract, as imagined by Ballow, was a
productive means “of integration of the trust concept both into
the general body of the law” 124 and of “analyzing and classifying the case-law on trusts.” 125 Furthermore, Ballow observed
that trust and contract law both had a jurisdictional home in
Chancery, where claims “regard[ed] not the outward form, but
the inward substance and essence of the matter, . . . where the
persons interested fully intend[ed] to contract a perfect obligation, though, by mistake or accident, they omit[ted] the set
form of law.” 126 Legal historians note, however, that the contract analogy was ultimately overshadowed by the analogy to
property.127
In a modern context, John Langbein has argued that it is
important to revive this understanding of trusts as contracts.
121. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 311 (2009) (“Almost all cases in Chancery can be reduced to this

simple formula, and the answer of conscience was as simple: promises have to
be kept—pacta sunt servanda . . . .” (citing Franz Metzger, The Last Phase of
the Medieval Chancery, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 79, 84 (Alan Harding ed., 1980))).
122. Michael Macnair, The Conceptual Basis of Trusts in the Later 17th
and Early 18th Centuries, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE 207, 235 (Richard Helmholz &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998). Hansmann and Mattei remark that “in
the continental legal tradition it was obligation that played the most important role in framing trust-like arrangements.” Hansmann & Mattei, supra
note 13, at 441.
123. Jones, supra note 16, at 162 (citing HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF
EQUITY (1737)).
124. Macnair, supra note 122. Ballow is generally credited with writing the
1737 A TREATISE OF EQUITY. See, e.g., WILLIAM & MARY L. LIB., A Treatise of
Equity, WYTHEPEDIA: THE GEORGE WYTHE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www
.lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Treatise_of_Equity (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018).
125. Id.
126. JOHN LORD ELDON, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 40–41 (1820).
127. Macnair, supra note 122 (“English law schools . . . teach trusts as a
branch of property law, not a branch of obligations.”).
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Langbein writes that the contract analogy has become increasingly apt “in light of the great changes that have occurred in
the character and function of the modern trust.” 128 Langbein
observes that “[t]he modern trust has become a management
regime for a portfolio of financial assets,” 129 making the contractual nature of trusts readily apparent. Langbein points
specifically to changes in the fiduciary-duty standard in trust
law, the new prevalence of institutional trustees, and the reliance on the remedy of specific performance as evidence of the
likeness between trust and contract.130 Trusts, like contracts,
may also share long-term goals since “contracting parties may
be assumed to desire a set of contract terms that will maximize
the value of the exchange.” 131 The bottom line: “Trusts are contracts.” 132
b. Are Charitable Gift Agreements Contracts?
Private trusts may indeed be contracts, but there is still a
question about whether charitable trusts fit the rubric. Langbein excludes charitable trusts from his account of trust as contract, stating that “contractarian autonomy is more restrained”
with the charitable trust. 133 Trust and gift instruments are, he
observes, a highly specialized form of contract with a thirdparty beneficiary: “Charitable trusts are quasi-public institutions that must satisfy standards of public benefit articulated
both in the common law and in the tax code and regulatory
law.” 134 Donors and institutions are not, therefore, contracting
with full freedom. Donors must align charitable gifts with the
institution’s mission, which is in turn circumscribed by the
charitable purposes doctrine and tax law.135 Charitable trusts
128. Langbein, supra note 17, at 643.
129. Id. at 629.
130. Id. at 628 (“ The law of fiduciary administration, which is the centerpiece of the modern trust, is overwhelmingly contractarian.”).
131. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89
(1977).
132. Langbein, supra note 17, at 627.
133. Id. at 631.
134. Id. See also William P. Sullivan, The Restricted Charitable Gift as
Third-Party Beneficiary Contract, 52 HIGHER REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 79
(2017) (stating that contract is the appropriate lens for analyzing restricted
gifts because of the principle of private autonomy).
135. The charitable purposes doctrine is codified by the UTC and states
that: “A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or munic-
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and gift agreements are, from this perspective, a carve-out from
his general proposition.
In other respects, however, the analogy still stands. Alex
Johnson and Ross Taylor have taken up this question and concluded that charitable trusts are best understood as relational
contracts. “[T]he charitable trust,” they observe, “is in some respects the prototypical relational contract: it is a long-term, inherently flexible arrangement that employs fiduciary standards
as a bonding mechanism . . . and in which the precise terms of
the agreement (trust) are incapable of resolution ex ante.” 136
Charitable trust and gift agreements can be understood as relational contracts in the sense that “the object of contracting is
not primarily to allocate risks, but to signify a commitment to
cooperate.” 137 Charitable gift agreements, like relational contracts, are defined by the impossibility of complete knowledge.
Gift agreements cannot ever be drafted such that they are responsive to and address all the external events as well as administrative problems that come with time. 138
In addition, charitable gift agreements are almost always
long-term agreements, even when the agreement governs the
terms of a spend-down gift instead of an endowed one. In this
respect, gift agreements—like relational contracts—tend to be
agreements in which “the parties are presumed to have intended an open-ended relationship, with the contract providing a
framework within which adjustment may continually take
place.” 139 Endowed gift agreements that exist in perpetuity, in
particular, share with relational contracts this quality of openendedness given that the gift restrictions on these gifts may
govern the gift administration for not just decades, but centuries. In such cases, “[w]here the future contingencies are pecuipal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the
community.” UNIF. TR. CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
136. Alex M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic
Interpretation to Cy Pres and America’s Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545,
571 (1989).
137. Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for “ The Wisdom of Solomon,” 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1123, 1171 (1987) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and
the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565,
569).
138. For this reason, the prevailing tendency in development offices is
therefore to draft agreements that specify fewer details and build in more flexibility rather than less.
139. Halpern, supra note 137 at 1171.
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liarly intricate or uncertain”—as happens with both long-term
gift agreements and relational contracts—“practical difficulties
arise that impede the contracting parties’ efforts to allocate optimally all risks at the time of contracting.” 140 From this perspective, charitable gift agreements strongly resemble relational contracts.
2. Contract Law and Commercial Impracticability

Contract law, like trust law, has doctrines that allow one
party’s obligations to be excused in limited circumstances. The
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration—
collectively named the doctrines of excuse—are available in
cases of changed circumstances, frustration of purpose, and
economic hardship. This Section analyzes the contours of commercial impracticability and explains how the doctrine has
played out in several landmark cases.
a. Contract’s Doctrines of Excuse
Before 1863, the leading case concerning excuse and discharge from contract terms was Paradine v. Jane. 141 In Paradine, the landlord brought an action to recover unpaid rent
from a tenant who raised the defense that he had been deprived of enjoying the rented property because an invading enemy army had demolished it. 142 The tenant argued that he
should have been excused from paying further rental payments
to the landlord, once the army had laid waste to the property. 143 The court did not find this defense persuasive and concluded that the tenant bore the risks of performance since he
could have made contractual provisions to guard himself
against unforeseen contingencies. 144
In 1863, however, the doctrine changed. Taylor v. Caldwell 145 established the doctrine of impossibility. 146 Caldwell
140. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981).
141. Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897.
142. Id. at 897.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309.
146. One scholar argues that three cases excusing performance predate
Taylor: Williams v. Lloyd (1628) 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (detailing a case where the
subject matter of the contract of bailment was destroyed); Hyde v. Dean &
Canons of Windsor (1557) 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (articulating a situation where a
party to a personal services contract died); Abbott of Westminster v. Clerke
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owned a music hall that he rented to Taylor for use as a concert
venue, but before the concerts could take place, the hall burned
to the ground. 147 Taylor then sued Caldwell for breach of contract. 148 Taylor held that an implied condition did exist in the
contract that would excuse one party from performance under
certain, exceptional circumstances, in the absence of express
terms to the contrary. 149 The court stated: “[I]n contracts in
which the performance depends on the continued existence of a
given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or
thing shall excuse the performance.” 150 After Taylor, courts began to allow discharge from obligation and performance
“[w]here the parties’ particular purpose [had] been frustrated
by an unanticipated contingency, . . . since the bargain [had]
lost its value.” 151
The doctrine of commercial impracticability first emerged
in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard in 1916.152 The parties
had entered into a written agreement obliging the defendants
to haul gravel from the plaintiff’s land to prepare it for the construction of a bridge. 153 When a conflict arose because the defendants had hauled less than expected or bargained for, the
court ruled in favor of the defendants. The court wrote that the
defendants could not have hauled out any more gravel “‘by ordinary means,’ or except by the use, at great expense, of a
stream dredger, and the earth and gravel so taken could not
have been used without first having been dried at great expense and delay.” 154
Following the logic of Taylor and its progeny, the Mineral
Park court observed that it was “well settled that, where performance depends upon the existence of a given thing, and such
existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement, perfor(1536) 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (describing a case where a supervening illegality due to
a subsequent Act of Parliament excused performance). See John Henry Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things—The
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419, 420 (1969).
147. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 310.
148. Id. at 311.
149. Id. at 312.
150. Id. at 314.
151. Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 232 (1987).
152. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916).
153. Id. at 458.
154. Id. at 459.
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mance is excused to the extent that the thing ceases to exist or
turns out to be nonexistent.” 155 Extending this logic, the court
concluded that impossibility meant more than a literal change
in circumstance: “A thing is impossible in legal contemplation
when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.” 156 The
court qualified this statement, however, by adding that a defendant could not raise this defense solely because costs exceeded original estimations and therefore entailed a financial
loss for the defendant.157 Rather, “where the difference in cost
is so great as here, and has the effect, as found, of making performance impracticable, the situation is not different from that
of a total absence of earth and gravel.” 158
The question left unanswered by Mineral Park has persisted, that is, at what point does cost and hardship become prohibitive. Put another way: “When does a difference in degree become a difference in kind?” 159 As Mineral Park concluded,
“Economic events which are unpredictable to some extent cannot be the subject of an action to discharge or to reform merely
because the parties are disappointed with the manner in which
events unfolded.” 160 A number of courts have declined to extend
Mineral Park’s broad holding to other scenarios. In W.H. Edgar
& Son v. Grocers’ Wholesale Co., an Eighth Circuit case not
long after Mineral Park, the court returned to a dictionary definition of impracticable—“[i]ncapable of being practiced, performed, or accomplished by the means employed or at command” 161—and concluded that this “common and ordinary” 162
meaning was appropriate in the absence of “financial panic or
depression.” 163
The bulk of impracticability cases, however, have arisen
only in the past half century, as “courts have attempted to
155. Id. at 459 (citing Williams v. Miller, 68 Cal. 290 (Cal. 1885); Brick Co.
v. Pond, 38 Ohio St. 65 (Ohio 1882); see also Ridgely v. Conewago Iron Co.,
53 F. 988 (E.D. Pa. 1893)).
156. Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 460 (citing 1 BEACH ON CONTRACTS
§ 216 (1897)).
157. Id. at 460.
158. Id.
159. Walter, supra note 151, at 234.
160. Id. at 253.
161. W.H. Edgar & Son v. Grocers’ Wholesale Co., 1 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir.
1924).
162. W.H. Edgar & Son, 1 F.2d at 223.
163. Id.
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make sensible application of the doctrine to a confused and
complex commercial world in which contractual relations were
formed in a context, if not of war, then of the rumors of war,
embargo, shortages, and inflation.” 164 In this modern context,
the Third Circuit has articulated the general standard: “The
party seeking to excuse his performance must not only show
that he can perform only at a loss but also that the loss will be
especially severe and unreasonable.” 165 Section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, followed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,166 sets forth the minimum requirements for
excusing contract performance, stating that nonperformance is
excused “if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” Neither courts nor uniform law provides any additional guidance
on how to “define or categorize those contingencies which entitle a party to claim impracticability.” 167
Like trust law impracticability, then, contract impracticability can be a blurry doctrine that forces judicial guesswork
about the intention of contracting parties. 168 Nevertheless, the
focus is on extreme cost in the context of extreme circumstances brought on by war, natural disaster, unforeseen events, and
financial panic.
b. ALCOA: The Role of Financial Hardship
The modern commercial impracticability doctrine was
forged in a time of international crisis and inflation when “the
uncertainty surrounding the growth and development of private nuclear power . . . [and] the sharp increase in fuel costs . . .
164. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1145.
165. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n., 563 F.2d 588, 600 (3d Cir.
1977).
166. U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N). The Restatement “treats impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose as
tandem concepts, placing each squarely in the realm of inherent judicial power
to do what justice requires by way of relieving contractual obligation where
extraordinary circumstance so requires.” Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Frustration of
Contractual Purpose—Doctrine or Myth, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 239, 259 (1996).
167. Walter, supra note 151, at 227.
168. See Marianne M. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability—Does It Really Exist?, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 241 (1980); Schlegel, supra note 146; John H.
Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195
(1982); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt To Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203 (1979).

2018]

KEEPING PROMISES

1819

provided the dramatic setting for the troubled and, to many,
troubling, judicial treatment of impracticability.” 169 One reason
for increased fuel costs was the closure of the Suez Canal,
which forced ships to travel around the Cape of Good Hope. 170
This rerouting resulted in extra expense, which in turn led to a
spate of cases turning on the claim of commercial impracticability. 171 Consequently, “[t]he modern . . . doctrine of commercial
impracticability . . . finds its most recognized illustrations in
the so-called ‘Suez cases,’ arising out of the various closings of
the Suez Canal.”172
In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, for example, the plaintiff company claimed it had a right to be paid
the increased cost of shipping a full cargo of wheat from Texas
to Iran via the Cape of Good Hope because of the Suez Canal
closure.173 The court held that performance was not impracticable and therefore not excused.174 That the Suez Canal might
be closed, the court remarked, was foreseeable, and the conditions the ship faced taking the alternate route were not onerous.175 The only difference, the court stated, was the cost. 176
The court added that cost could, potentially, render performance impracticable.177 However, the court concluded, “to justify relief there must be more of a variation between expected
cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative.” 178
The Transatlantic court set forth what would be a recurring refrain—cost may count, but not here. Other courts followed this
line of reasoning, and the vast majority of commercial impracti-

169. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1145.
170. See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States,
363 F.2d 312, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
171. Id.
172. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
173. Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 315.
174. Id. at 320.
175. Id. at 319 (“ The goods shipped were not subject to harm from the
longer, less temperate Southern route.”).
176. Id. (“ The only factor operating here in the appellant’s favor is the added expense, [which was] allegedly $43,972.00 above and beyond the contract
price of $305,842.92.”).
177. Id. (“[I]t may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and difficulty of performance never constitute impracticability. . . .”).
178. Id.
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cability claims failed. One major exception was the ALCOA
case.179
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., (ALCOA), the two parties entered into an agreement that ALCOA
would provide Essex with its long-term aluminum needs, so
that Essex could expand its operations into the manufacture of
aluminum wire products. 180 The contract contained a price escalation formula that varied the price per pound in accordance
with changes in the Wholesale Price Index–Industrial Commodities (WPI).181 This escalation formula “was intended by
the parties to reflect actual changes in the cost of the non-labor
items utilized by ALCOA in the production of aluminum from
alumina at its Warrick, Indiana smelting plant.” 182 The problem began in 1973, when “OPEC actions to increase oil prices
and unanticipated pollution control costs greatly increased ALCOA’s electricity costs.” 183 Electric power rates rose much more
rapidly than the WPI, and ALCOA was faced with a substantial
cost increase.184 The court credited ALCOA’s evidence that the
company stood to lose in excess of $75,000,000 if forced to carry
through on its contractual obligation.185
The court set forth the Restatement and the UCC standards and stated:
A mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is
intended to cover. 186

The court also noted that variations in value and price “are the
rule rather than the exception,” and that relief could only be
granted “when the variation in value is very great and is
caused by a supervening event that was not in fact contemplated by the parties and the risk of which was not allocated by
them.” 187
179. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc. (ALCOA), 499 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
180. Id. at 55–56.
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 58.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 59.
186. Id. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
187. Id. at 72–73 (quoting ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1355 (1962)).
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The court nevertheless observed that there could be exceptional circumstances that merited relief, such as “a severe
shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown
of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a
marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from
securing supplies necessary to his performance.” 188 The ALCOA
situation, the court concluded, was such a case. 189
Ruling in favor of ALCOA, the court stated: “This strict
standard of severe disappointment is clearly met in the present
case.” 190 The court found that ALCOA had sufficiently proved
that the company stood to lose “well over $60 million dollars
out of pocket over the life of the contract due to the extreme deviation of the WPI-IC from ALCOA’s actual costs.” 191 Preceding
cases, the court reasoned, had not shown such a “gravity of
harm.” 192 Moreover, the court mentioned that “the circumstances surrounding the contract show a deliberate avoidance
of abnormal risks.” 193
Later cases have consistently declined to follow this example, which now stands out as an outlier result and has been
widely criticized.194 Nevertheless, the court’s decision in ALCOA offers a useful benchmark for demonstrating that financial hardship is sometimes so severe that a party merits relief.
Indeed, ALCOA stands for the proposition that there is a point
at which contract enforcement would be manifestly unjust to
one party, and that party would suffer economic consequences
capable of changing the entire financial life of the company. In
Transatlantic, the court observed: “The doctrine ultimately
represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the community’s interest in having contracts enforced according to
their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of

188. Id. at 74. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1977)).
189. Id. at 76.
190. Id. at 73.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 76.
193. Id. at 75.
194. Halpern, supra note 137, at 1126 (stating “in the seven years since the
case was decided, ALCOA has had little impact on judicial thought”).
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requiring performance.” 195 In ALCOA, the court identified that
line. 196
c. Westinghouse: Why Is Hardship So Hard

Westinghouse, like ALCOA, is a story of the energy crisis
and it tracks the history of nuclear power.197 In 1964, Congress
enacted legislation that permitted private ownership of uranium, an essential component of nuclear power. 198 Westinghouse
was optimistic about the future of nuclear power: “Westinghouse, a manufacturer of [nuclear steam supply] systems, was
most anxious to enter into a contract with Florida for its proposed plants . . . .” 199 The court remarked that there was great
uncertainty in the industry: “While the potential for nuclear
powered plants for the production of electricity was considered
bright, reactor sales were not abundant . . . . [U]ncertainty existed during the period of 1965–66 as to whether nuclear power
could compete economically in most areas of the country with
fossil fuels.”200
Westinghouse nevertheless entered into negotiations with
Florida to build nuclear reactors for the state.201 Because the
state of Florida had no expertise in nuclear power at the time,
Florida officials insisted on Westinghouse providing a full
package of services. 202 In order to finalize the contract and in
anticipation of profit, “Westinghouse took a calculated risk,” 203
agreeing to “a guaranteed ten year fuel cycle cost” 204 that included “the cost of uranium and the purchase and disposal of
the spent fuel as a part of the fuel cycle.”205 The contract obligated Westinghouse to dispose of the fuel “as [the company]
sees fit,” and both parties contemplated reprocessing as the
most likely mode of disposal.206 However, commercial repro195. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
196. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. at 79.
197. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F.
Supp. 440, 443 (E.D. Va. 1981).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 444.
203. Id. at 446.
204. Id. at 444.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 443.
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cessing was not a common technique used for disposal and
Westinghouse “fully understood” that the deal was premised on
what the company then deemed to be a reasonable business
risk that “commercial reprocessing would come to pass and
would be economically feasible.” 207
Reprocessing, unfortunately for Westinghouse, never became economically feasible. 208 Moreover, eleven years after the
signing of the contract, a presidential ban was placed on reprocessing, sealing Westinghouse’s fate. 209 Consequently, except
for eighteen spent fuel assemblies that Westinghouse removed
(out of an estimated 981 spent fuel assemblies over the life of
the contract), the company did not dispose of any spent fuel. 210
Because of Westinghouse’s refusal to remove the spent fuel and
consequent breach of contract, Florida was forced to spend approximately ten million dollars to store the spent fuel, which
resulted in “increased operating and maintenance costs, as well
as potential environmental difficulties.” 211 Florida subsequently filed a breach of promise claim against Westinghouse, seeking monetary damages for the money spent to store the spent
fuel, as well as a court order for Westinghouse to remove this
fuel.212 Westinghouse claimed commercial impracticability as a
defense.213
The court concluded that “the facts simply do not support
the conclusion that Westinghouse’s performance has been rendered impracticable” 214 and referred to the “plain language of
the contract” 215 that obligated Westinghouse to remove the
spent fuel. The court recognized that Westinghouse had anticipated a profit from reprocessing the fuel, which had not come to
pass, but noted that increased expense was not generally a
winning argument. 216 Furthermore, the court explained:
“[I]mpracticability by reason of additional expense is not to be
determined by reference to the loss, or failure to profit, from
one particular contract term in isolation. Rather, it is to be
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 447.
See id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id. at 453.
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judged from the perspective of the entire undertaking.” 217 According to this holistic analysis, Westinghouse had assumed a
certain risk and the fact that no profit had been obtained from
fuel reprocessing did not lead to a finding of impracticability. 218
The larger part of the court’s analysis, however, dealt with
the foreseeability of the result. If a “promisor had no reason to
anticipate a supervening event which radically increases the
difficulty of performance, or which renders performance impossible, it is manifestly unfair to hold him to the agreement.” 219
The relevant example for the court was a total crop failure. 220
The rationale for holding parties to a high standard of foreseeability was that, if the parties could have reasonably anticipated an event, then the parties should have bargained for provisions to protect themselves in the eventuality of such
occurrences.221 The court acknowledged that “the future is by
definition unknowable,” but a party to a contract could, or
should be “aware of a certain trend, or that a given state of affairs is in flux, or that an assumption is more than usually uncertain.” 222
The court further emphasized that Florida had specifically
bargained to have no responsibility for fuel removal. The court
repeated the statement of Florida’s chief executive officer, who
said: “I do not want to buy a sheep to get a suit of clothes, and
have the sheep sheared, dyed, treated, woven into cloth, cut,
and sewn into a suit . . . . I want to buy a suit already made.” 223
The court also had little doubt about Westinghouse’s assumption of risk: “Westinghouse was, in its eagerness to construct
the power plants, willing to accept risks which Florida was not
willing to take.” 224 In short, Westinghouse had been eager to
reap anticipated profit and had failed to bargain for any provisions that would have saved the company in the event of market changes and new regulation.
Westinghouse, consequently, affirmed the proposition that,
absent cataclysmic intervening circumstances, parties were re217. Id. (citing E. Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla.
1975); United States v. Wegematic, 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966)).
218. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F.
Supp. at 454.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 444.
224. Id. at 447.
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sponsible for creating various forms of self-protection through
bargaining.225 While degree of monetary loss and economic
hardship are factors, then, in the assessment of commercial
impracticability, corporate and contract norms place even
greater weight on the ability of contracting parties to bargain
and create their own contractual exit mechanisms. Financial
hardship may create impracticable circumstances. Companies,
however, are expected to bargain around foreseeable difficulties.
B. RULES FOR MEETING NEEDS
If contract law provides lessons about keeping promises,
property law provides lessons about meeting needs. And if contract law is about managing the relationship between parties,
property law is about the managing the asset. In this Section, I
explain the longstanding connections between trust and property law and analyze relevant doctrines that property law has
to offer as examples of what property owners can do in situations of difficulty, need, and impracticability.
1. The Trust-Property Connection
However compelling the comparison between trust and
contract is, the comparison between trust and property is the
conventional one. Trust has long been considered a form or
branch of property law, and most accounts focus on trust’s
“proprietary interests and relations.” 226 This approach is often
based on the trust’s origin as a means of conveying land. 227
Moreover, historically, a trust could not exist without the
res. 228 Whereas a maxim of equity is that a trust will not fail
for the want of a trustee, the same cannot be said when the
trust asset is absent. The asset—property—is critical to the
creation and maintenance of a trust.
a. The Roots of the Connection
Early modern legal writers, including Blackstone, analogized the trust to a Roman form of property ownership called
the fideicommissum, which emphasized the proprietary nature
225. Id.
226. Macnair, supra note 122, at 213.
227. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 621, 628–29 (2004).
228. The UTC has abrogated this rule and a completely unfunded trust can
now exist. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 401 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
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of the trust. 229 Another analogy, that between the trust and the
usufruct, also strengthened the property facet of the trust. 230
To further these analogies and draw out the property nature of
trusts, commentators have routinely highlighted the beneficiary’s interest in the trust property, and the fact that trusts
are a vehicle for wealth transfer: “trusts of land descend as
land should, including following local custom of the land where
the property is located.” 231
The more modern debate concerning the nature of trust extended these conversations and became, in many ways, a dialogue between Frederic W. Maitland and Austin W. Scott. 232
Maitland was “the greatest scholar of the common law” and
“got the contractarian basis of the trust right,” according to
Langbein. Nevertheless, Scott “had the fortitude to write his
error into the Restatement of Trusts.” 233 The first Restatement
of Trusts, from 1935, said “[t]he creation of a trust is conceived
of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract.” 234 More recently, Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei supported the trust-as-property theory
by highlighting the importance of trust law’s asset partitioning
function. Hansmann and Mattei suggest “that it is precisely the
property-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law.” 235 Of particular importance to Hansmann
and Mattei is the way in which spendthrift and discretionary
trusts enable a beneficiary to shelter assets from creditors.
Hansmann and Mattei observe, “[w]hen we say that assets are
someone’s property, we generally mean (among other things)
that those assets are presumed available to satisfy claims of
that person’s creditors.” 236 Trust law modifies these property
rules by taking trust assets out of the reach of creditors and
“thus appropriately can be said to involve property law.” 237
229. Macnair, supra note 122, at 214.
230. Id. at 215–16.
231. Id. at 222.
232. Langbein, supra note 17, at 644.
233. Id.
234. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1935).
Scott resisted the contract analogy because it did not account for self-settled
trusts or equitable tracing against nonparties to the trust deal. See Austin
Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM.
L. REV. 269, 270 (1917).
235. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 13, at 469–70.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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A trust may be a contract. But a trust is also property.
Trusts involve the keeping and care of assets, and trust law
both builds on and modifies property law in regulating this specialized form of property ownership and management.
b. Charitable Trusts Are a Special Property Type

Charitable trusts and gifts are also types of property.
Charitable giving is the transfer of property, and the gift itself
is solicited, transferred, and ultimately managed as an institutional asset. But charitable gifts are a special kind of property
because they are exempt from the rule against perpetuities.
Detailed gift conditions placed on endowed gifts therefore allow
donors to control their contributions well past the end of their
own lives.238 Charitable gifts are also subject to special tax
rules. Since the introduction of the charitable deduction in
1917, a donor has been allowed to deduct charitable contributions, subject to certain limitations.239 These charitable contributions can be made either as trusts, as lifetime gifts, or bequests. 240 A donor can deduct up to fifty percent of her annual
adjusted gross income in charitable gifts and can also take carryover gift deductions for five years. 241 This includes gifts made
as charitable trusts, for which donors can take a tax deduction
at the time the trust is created. 242

238. In addition, nonprofit corporations can exist in perpetuity.
239. The deduction is codified at I.R.C. § 170 (2012). I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) defines entities to which deductible contributions may be made. Congress first
adopted a contributions deduction in 1917. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63,
§ 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
Until the mid-1950s, the Code limited most people to a deduction
equal to fifteen percent of their income; this limit rose to thirty percent in 1954 and remained at that level until 1969. Also prior to 1969,
individuals whose charitable gifts and income taxes together surpassed ninety percent of their taxable income in eight of the ten preceding years were allowed an unlimited deduction . . . . Also in 1969,
the general AGI limit rose to its current level of fifty percent.
Miranda P. Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 171–72 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 411 (7th ed. 2013) (“Although Congress provides
incentives for individuals to donate significant portions of their income to
charities, it does not believe individuals should be permitted to eliminate their
tax liability entirely . . . .”). Charitable contributions can also reduce tax liability in the context of both gift and estate taxes as well.
240. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
241. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(D)(ii).
242. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).
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These exemptions and various forms of special treatment
exist because charitable gifts are supposed to provide public
benefit by funding the purposes stated in the charitable purposes doctrine. 243 In this way charitable gifts are intrinsically
different from ordinary property. Addressing the question of
tax treatment for charitable institutions, the Supreme Court in
Bob Jones University v. United States stated: “[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.” 244 Charitable gifts are a
form of property meant to provide specific benefits not just to
an institution but also to the public.
2. Property Doctrines of Necessity and Hardship
Property rules focus heavily on questions about how to enable productivity, efficiency, and alienability with respect to
property. In particular, the doctrines of necessity and variance
have bearing on trust law because, with these doctrines, “[t]he
focus is on use rather than ownership.” 245 In this Section, I
analyze in detail how easements by necessity and variances operate. I also address how these doctrines solve problems of necessity and hardship and how these approaches have salience
for trust law.
a. Easements by Necessity: Learning from the Landlocked
Easements by necessity are implied easements that arise
“when there is no feasible way to enter or leave a property
without trespassing on another person’s land.” 246 The Restatement (Third) of Property defines an easement by necessity as
follows: “A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land
conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, of
rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies

243. See Eason, supra note 2, at 124 (“[G]ifts for charitable purposes must
by definition inure to the public good.”).
244. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
245. John G. Cameron, Jr., What You Should Know About Easements,
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Mar. 2010, http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/
lacidoirep/articles/PREL1003_Cameron_thumb.pdf.
246. DANIEL B. BOGART & JOHN MAKDISI, INSIDE PROPERTY LAW: WHAT
MATTERS AND WHY 228 (2009).
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the creation of a servitude granting or reserving such rights.” 247
Similarly, the Restatement drafters noted: “Access rights are
almost always necessary to the enjoyment of property. In a
conveyance that would otherwise deprive the owner of access to
property, access rights will always be implied.” 248
The common law rule can be traced back to the thirteenth
century in England. A maxim dating from the time of Edward I
(1239–1307) declared that “one who grants a thing must be understood to have granted that without which the thing could
not be or exist.” 249 A fourteenth-century English case held that
a grantee was allowed to use a fishing net or other, similar device to take fish if there was a grant of the pond with the fish.
The grantee could not, however, “cut a ditch and drain the pond
for the purpose of getting the fish.”250
The case and maxim both exemplify the theory of the
easement by necessity, which is that property law presumes
the intention of the parties is to convey benefit. Otherwise stated, “the law will not presume that was the intention of the parties, that one should convey land to the other, in such a manner
that the grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance.” 251 Later cases have also articulated a complementary
public-policy rationale. In Buss v. Dyer, a case that turned on
access to a chimney, the court, in declining to grant the easement, stated: “by a fiction of law, there is an implied reservation or grant to meet a special emergency, on grounds of public
policy, as it has been said, in order that no land should be left
inaccessible for purposes of cultivation.” 252 Public policy favors
the productive use of property.253
Standards vary by state, but the general framework for
easements by necessity requires that there must be unity of
ownership of the entire tract prior to division, the necessity for
easement must have existed at time of severance, and necessity
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 2.15 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 1989).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 2.15 cmt. a.
250. See James W. Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 571,
572 (1925). Simonton provides a good overview of the history of the doctrine.
Id.; see also Peter G. Glenn, Implied Easements in the North Carolina Courts:
An Essay on the Meaning of “Necessary,” 58 N.C. L. REV. 223 (1980).
251. Simonton, supra note 250, at 576.
252. Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287, 291 (1878).
253. Id. (noting that, as a matter of public policy, “no land should be left
inaccessible for purposes of cultivation”).
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for the particular easement must be great. 254 Within this
framework, judicial inquiry focuses on what degree of necessity
the grantee must experience and what the scope of the easement is.255 With respect to the degree of necessity, property
standards are somewhat akin to contract impracticability and
financial hardship standards and “the overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions hold that an easement by necessity must be
more than simply a matter of convenience.” 256 For this reason,
if the landowner has alternative access, even if the alternative
is substantially less convenient, courts hesitate to grant the
easements. 257
The test then becomes whether reasonable or strict necessity exists for an easement. The majority rule is reasonable necessity, and “courts will normally consider the circumstances of
both parties and then balance the needs of the claimant against
the burden that will be placed on the servient estate.” 258 This
majority standard is based on the notion that property should
be used productively and “to accomplish this goal, a court will
lend its hand to establish a right of ingress and egress where
none exists.” 259
Easements by necessity most frequently occur when a parcel of property is landlocked. Courts grant property owners
easements so they can access their property, exit their property, and—in the intervening time—put the property to productive use. As one scholar has said: “Because the doctrine of implied easements is firmly rooted in public policy favoring the
productive use of land, there are very few cases in which the
owner of landlocked property has been denied an easement by
necessity.” 260
For example, a recent Connecticut case turned on the question of whether an easement by necessity could be created to

254. Some states have statutory rules for easement by necessity, but most
have a common law rule.
255. See Simonton, supra note 250, at 580.
256. Hunter C. Carroll, Property—Easements by Necessity: What Level of
Necessity Is Required?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 475, 476 (1995).
257. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 101 (1987).
258. Carroll, supra note 256, at 476–77.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 476.
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“provide commercial electricity to a parcel cut off from commercial electricity.” 261
In 2001, the plaintiff and his neighbors had entered into an
agreement with the defendant to improve an existing right-ofway easement by installing a utility distribution system under
it. 262 The defendant charged each neighbor $7500 for use of the
new utility easement, demanding in addition that the plaintiff
pay not only the $7500 but also grant the defendant the “power
to move the location of the easement at will.” 263 After refusing
the defendant’s terms, the plaintiff was cut off from access to
commercial electricity. The plaintiff powered his house with a
generator, but alleged that the generator did not provide adequate power for “powering security devices, turning on automatically in the event of a flood, and running a refrigerator to
preserve perishable food without constant operation of the generator.” 264 The trial court nevertheless granted summary
judgment for the defendant, concluding that easements by necessity could not be created to provide utilities. 265
The appellate court disagreed. The appellate court admitted that classic examples of easements by necessity involved a
grantee’s inability to “use his property beneficially because he
lacks physical access to it.” 266 The same reasoning about presumed intent that operated in the classic examples, the court
concluded, also could be extended to use of utilities:
Utilities are so obviously necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of all types of property that the law will assume that parties to
a land conveyance intend to convey whatever is necessary to ensure a
property’s access to utilities in the same way that the law presumes
the parties intended to convey an easement for physical access. 267

The court mentioned that “because utilities are required
for most reasonable uses of property, public policy dictates that
access to utilities be implied to ensure ‘that no land should be
left . . . incapable of being put to profitable use.’” 268 The plaintiff was entitled to an easement by necessity.

261. Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 134 A.3d 1278, 1283 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2016), aff ’d 174 A.3d 779 (Conn. 2018).
262. Id. at 1281.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1282.
266. Id. at 1283.
267. Id. at 1285.
268. Id.
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As for the scope of the easement and the duration, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had the right to use the
easement “for all purposes consistent with the reasonable use
of the benefited land.” 269 The easement was not limited to
“those purposes that existed at the time the benefited and burdened properties were created.” 270 Original conditions did not
dictate present of future conditions. This conclusion followed,
the court remarked, from the general rule that “the need constituting the necessity that implies an easement by necessity
may change over time.” 271 Necessity, then, for the court was a
changing measure requiring flexible judicial relief in order to
ensure productive use of the property.
The implications for trust law and cy pres are clear. Property doctrine assumes that a grantor does not generally intend
to give a gift that cannot be properly or effectively used. Furthermore, public policy dictates that a grantee should not and
need not be stuck with property that cannot be put to productive use. Property rules on policy emphasize efficient asset use,
productive property, and grantee need.
b. Looking to Variance: Zoned for Impracticability
Variance is another means of exempting property from
regulatory requirements—zoning ordinances, in this case—
when compliance would present undue hardship for the property owner. Variances are, therefore, “referred to as a type of
safety valve against overly intrusive land use regulation,” and
they provide “a means for a landowner to obtain relief where
hardship imposed on an individual parcel of land by a zoning
ordinance outweighs the public benefit sought by the regulation.” 272
Property owners may seek variance in a range of situations, most particularly when the property owner wishes to use
her property in a way that is prohibited by applicable zoning
laws.273 The key to a successful variance application is establishing that “an unnecessary or undue hardship would befall
the land in question—and not the landowner personally—if the

269. Id. at 1284.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 253, 261 (2013).
273. There are both use and dimensional variances. Here, I focus on use
variances. Id. at 263.
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letter of the zoning ordinance were strictly observed.” 274 The
result is that a “use variance gives a property owner permission
to use the property in a manner inconsistent with a local zoning
ordinance.” 275
Use-based zoning and variance laws emerged in the context of Euclidian or single-use zoning, which was established as
constitutional by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. in
1926.276 The variance ensured that zoning ordinances would
“remain constitutional by building in a mechanism that would
avoid imposing hardship on individual landowners.” 277 Variance doctrine developed alongside questions of governmental
takings and land-use regulation, and the variance helped to
circumvent charges of regulatory takings. By 1939, in Otto v.
Steinhilber, the New York Court of Appeals established a
framework for evaluating the merits of a variance request that
many jurisdictions have adopted. 278 In Otto, the court stated
that a zoning board could exercise discretion and grant a variance only: (1) if the property would not yield a reasonable return if used only as allowed by zoning ordinances; (2) if the
hardship was due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood; and (3) that the use to be
authorized would not alter local conditions or any public benefit
provided.279
Unnecessary or undue hardship is therefore a key factor in
granting variances. Also important, as highlighted by the Otto
framework, is the notion of reasonable return. Courts will not,
traditionally, grant a variance solely because of financial hardship or profit loss. However, if an owner can show that “no reasonable return is possible under permitted uses,” 280 her variance request is more likely to be successful. Accordingly,
variances, like easements by necessity, accentuate the efficient
use of property and the right of a property owner to get value
from her land. Variance doctrine also underscores that produc274. Id. at 262.
275. 7-Eleven v. Vill. of Mineola, 7 N.Y.S.3d 1209, 1210 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
276. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
277. Jonathan E. Cohen, Comment, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The
Variance in Zoning and Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 330 (1995).
278. 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 253, 297 (2013); see also Cohen, supra note 277, at 333–38.
279. Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939).
280. Cohen, supra note 277, at 336.
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tive use is a justification for modifying conditions of ownership
and setting aside certain forms of regulatory control. Variance
statutes differ somewhat by state, but the differences are minor. Virginia’s statute, for example, states: “[A] reasonable deviation [is granted] when the strict application of the ordinance
would unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property, and
such need for a variance would not be shared generally by other
properties, and provided such variance is not contrary to the
purpose of the ordinance.” 281
Judicial analysis of variance requests focuses accordingly
on both the level of hardship and the concept of reasonable return.282 For example, in Nowicki v. Zoning Hearing Board, a
2014 Pennsylvania case, the court evaluated whether a couple
who had bought property for a family home experienced unnecessary hardship when the property was rezoned for commercial
use before they could construct their residence.283 The question
was whether this change in zoning denied the couple all economically viable use of the property and created unnecessary
hardship. 284
The background was this: two days before the couple executed the sales agreement on the property in question, the borough enacted an ordinance that changed the zoning from residential to the Planned River-Oriented Development District
(PROD) category. The stated goal was to “to take advantage of
the views of the river, the recreational opportunities afforded
by the river and the Pump Station, as well as the shopping and
services available within walking distance in the business district.” 285 The couple had not yet begun construction on their
planned residence when the zoning change passed, and they
applied for a variance to build a single-family dwelling on the
property.286
At their hearing before the zoning board, eight neighbors
who had residential dwellings in the rezoned area appeared in
support of their request. Borough leaders also attended, however, and argued that the couple was not unnecessarily burdened
281. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2201 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
282. Other questions courts must confront are whether the burden was
self-created, whether it is unique to the property, and whether the variance
will cause any public detriment.
283. Nowicki v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 91 A.3d 287, 290 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2014).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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by the new restrictions because the new borough rules “permitted the Property to be used for both noncommercial and public
recreation.” 287 The zoning board denied the request on the
grounds the couple had failed to establish unnecessary hardship.288 On appeal, the trial court reversed the zoning board
and the case subsequently went to the state appellate court. 289
Addressing the question of value loss, the court remarked
that financial loss or failure to profit alone were not sufficient
grounds for a variance.290 On the other hand, the appellate
court remarked, “an applicant seeking a use variance need not
demonstrate that the property is rendered valueless as zoned in
order to show that a variance is needed to make reasonable use
of the property.” 291 In the couple’s case, the court concluded, because the property was located within a residential portion of
the PROD rezoned district, “it would be undesirable and ultimately unmarketable for an economically viable recreation use,
such as the golf practice facility or skating rink delineated in
the Ordinance.” 292 This lack of marketability of the property
was sufficient to establish unnecessary hardship.
In another variance case, from the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine in 2009, the court analyzed the question of hardship
through a similar lens but used the reasonable-return framework. 293 That case, Wister v. Town of Mount Desert, 294 turned
on the right of a property owner to build a driveway that did
not fit the zoning regulations. The proposed driveway was “not
wide enough to accommodate the proposed fourteen-foot-wide
driveway and allow a minimum five-foot setback on either side
as required by the driveway setback provision.” 295 The property
owner applied to the zoning board for a variance in order to

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 290−91.
290. Id. at 293 (“Evidence that the zoned use is less financially profitable
than the proposed use is insufficient to grant a variance.”).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 295.
293. “ The ‘reasonable return’ element of the ‘unnecessary hardship’ standard may be interpreted as requiring proof by the applicant that the zoning restriction destroys or greatly diminishes the value of a specific piece of property.” 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 253, 306–07 (2013).
294. Wister v. Town of Mount Desert, 974 A.2d 903, 906 (Me. 2009).
295. Id.
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construct this driveway, which would have helped provide access to a second lot he owned that was landlocked.296
The zoning board approved the variance, finding that a
hardship existed because the property owner could not “get a
reasonable return on the lots without a driveway.” 297 The decision was appealed up to the state supreme court, where the
court affirmed the board’s decision. The court agreed that “undue hardship” meant that “[t]he land in question can not yield
a reasonable return unless a variance is granted.” 298 Applying
the rule to the facts, the state supreme court concluded:
“[a]lthough Moore’s lots might have held some value without
driveway access, given its proximity to a golf course and conservation lands, the [zoning board’s] determination that, without a driveway allowing access to the lots, Moore will suffer the
practical loss of all beneficial use of the lots is not clearly erroneous.” 299
Use variances, then, like easements by necessity, privilege
the productive use of and a reasonable return on an asset. Variances allow for flexibility within a regulatory system, and create exemptions based on owner need. Variances provide a way
for property owners to meet their needs when compliance with
rules and restrictions is both costly and inefficient.
III. CRAFTING A CLEAR CY PRES STANDARD
What should the trust law standard for impracticability
look like? Both contract and property law are sufficiently similar to trust law in foundational ways such that their doctrines
can and should help inform the cy pres standard. In this Part, I
discuss exactly how contract and property rules can be used to
clarify trust law and, subsequently, aid institutional fiduciaries
as they confront recurring fiscal challenges.
A. USING CONTRACT: REPURPOSING FINANCIAL HARDSHIP
There is one clear lesson from the commercial impracticability doctrine: financial hardship should be a standard criteri296. Id.
297. Id. at 907.
298. Id. at 911–12. The other requirements were: “B. The need for a variance is due to the unique circumstances of the property and not to the general
conditions in the neighborhood; C. The granting of a variance will not alter the
essential character of the locality; and D. The hardship is not the result of action taken by the applicant or a prior owner.” Id.
299. Id. at 912.
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on for evaluating cy pres impracticability. Charitable institutions confront financial problems for any number of reasons including increases in costs over time, steep maintenance costs,
and decreases in income—whether from investments or new
gifts. 300 Accordingly, court dockets contain cy pres requests
from nonprofit institutions looking to gain flexibility in endowment spending by loosening donor conditions placed on restricted gifts. And the petitions that succeed, like the Corcoran’s, are from institutions on the brink of failure.
For example, in In re Polytechnic University, a New York
court granted cy pres relief allowing Polytechnic University to
modify gift restrictions on a bequest in order to avoid institutional failure.301 The donor had specified that the bequest was
meant for a professorship, research fellowships, and building
construction.302 However, as the court remarked, unforeseen
circumstances—including the “the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and its effect on the local economy, combined with the near meltdown of technological companies in
2001” 303—substantially diminished the university’s revenue.
This drop in revenue forced the institution to fall below the liquidity covenant on some of its loans and below the “composite
score requirements necessary for the University to participate
in federal financial aid programs.” 304 The court observed that
the donor’s “charitable intentions [would] be frustrated if Polytechnic University [were] forced to suspend operations.” 305
Consequently, the court concluded that removing the restrictions was the best approach, which allowed the university
to reclassify the bequest as unrestricted income. 306

300. Christian H. Brill, Art or Assets: University Museums and the Future
of Deaccessioning, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61, 64 (2011) (“ The decline in the
stock market caused extreme drops in museum endowments. Wealthy donors
chose to give to human services rather than the arts, and institutions were
forced to reduce hours, cut staff, increase fees, or consider more drastic
measures.”). For example, the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art’s endowment shrank twenty-four percent from 2008 to 2009. See MET. MUSEUM OF
ART, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2008–2009, at 52 (2009). Meanwhile, the
operating deficit increased from $1.9 million to $8.4 million from fiscal 2008 to
fiscal 2009. Id. at 50.
301. In re Polytechnic Univ., 812 N.Y.S.2d 304, 311 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
302. Id. at 306.
303. Id. at 311.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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Fisk University is another example of an institution that
sought cy pres relief in the midst of financial distress. Fisk
University, a historically black university founded in 1866, was
the recipient of 101 paintings that were donated by Georgia
O’Keeffe to the school in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 307 The
gift was conditioned on the requirement that the pieces could
not be sold and that they all be displayed at Fisk University as
one collection. 308
In 2005, in an attempt to remain financially solvent, the
university sought permission to sell two valuable paintings. 309
It claimed that its “bleak financial circumstance” 310 rendered it
“‘impractical to comply with the literal terms’ of the gifts,” 311 as
did “other material changes in circumstances that have occurred in the more than fifty years since the conditional gifts
were made.” 312 The complaint stated that the “purpose of the
proposed sale was to generate funds for the University’s ‘business plan’ to restore its endowment, improve its mathematics,
biology, and business administration departments, and build a
new science building.” 313
In concluding that the circumstances were impracticable,
the trial court relied on the testimony of Fisk’s president, who
“discussed the many cuts that had been implemented in an effort to reduce expenses, such as eliminating educational programming for students, reducing the salary of faculty and staff,

307. Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2009). Four of the paintings were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe, and
the rest O’Keeffe gave to the school from the Alfred Stieglitz collection, in her
capacity as executrix of the estate. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. While pending, the university’s request for relief morphed into a
request for the approval of a proposed settlement agreement with the Crystal
Bridges–Museum of American Art, Inc., “whereby the University would sell a
50% undivided interest in the entire Collection for $30 million . . . . [and] the
University and Crystal Bridges would each have the right to display the Collection at their respective facilities six months of each year.” Id. at 5.
310. Id. at 15.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 4; see also Brill, supra note 300, at 65 (“[U]niversity museums
serve two masters, answering to both museum and university boards. Because
a university museum cannot act completely independently, it is more susceptible to closure if its parent university decides that another priority—such as
chemistry labs—would better fulfill its educational mission. This is made unmistakably clear by the fundamentally different missions of independent museums and university museums.”).
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and mortgaging buildings on campus.” 314 Asked whether Fisk
was “viable” given the numerous financial challenges it faced,
the president stated “No, not at all.” 315 Accordingly, the trial
court allowed Fisk to modify the gift terms.316
These examples show that financial distress does sometimes obtain the desired result. Currently, however, because
financial hardship is not explicitly recognized as a core component of cy pres impracticability, judicial results are not predictable. Consequently, institutions that are unable to show immanent insolvency, like Girard College and Sweet Briar, will not
necessarily obtain cy pres relief. Moving forward, charitable institutions should be able to receive cy pres relief based upon the
fiduciaries making a strong showing of unsustainable financial
circumstances and recommending modifications. The fiduciaries can and should be presumed to be acting in the best interest
of the institution and using their discretion appropriately.
Therefore, cy pres modification is appropriate under such circumstances, not only to give institutions additional operational
latitude in crisis situations, but also to credit fiduciaries with
the authority and discretion to perform their job.
B. WHY A PROPERTY STANDARD IS BETTER
If financial hardship is a key criterion, the next question is
how to apply this standard of financial hardship. Not every
case is as clear-cut a case of financial need as were the cases
with Corcoran, Polytechnic University, or Fisk University, and
institutions should not be forced to the point of closure in order
to obtain cy pres relief. However, the same question that drives
commercial impracticability emerges in cy pres analysis—how
severe must the economic hardship be? The contract standard
would ensure that very few nonprofit institutions receive cy
pres relief. In this Section, I explain why the contract measure
of hardship is conceptually inappropriate in the cy pres context,
based on differences in bargaining and public benefit.
1. Bequests, Not Bargains
One reason that the trust law measure of hardship should
be lower than the contract law one is that the parties to gift
agreements do not necessarily bargain like ordinary contractu314. In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
315. Id. Furthermore, O’Leary testified that the annual cost of $131,000 to
maintain and display the collection was burdensome to the university. Id.
316. Id. at 591.
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al bargaining partners. The high contract-law standard is
based on the idea that the parties could and should have bargained for protections. Excuse is therefore not available “in situations in which the impossibility results from the actions of
one of the parties to the contract or where the promisor could
have relatively easily taken actions to avoid the failure of the
underlying condition.” 317 Bargaining is a central part of the
contractual relationship.
In charitable giving, bargaining plays a different and more
peripheral role. While the donor or the donor’s family is alive,
there is sometimes bargaining, to be sure. And for some major
gifts, there is even substantial bargaining. Gifts negotiations
can center, for example, on the amount of control retained by
the donors. When Lee Bass gave Yale University twenty million dollars in 1991, “[i]t was an unusual gift . . . because of the
specificity of its academic purpose.” 318 The gift was meant to
support the study of Western Civilization by creating seven endowed faculty positions for senior faculty and four new junior
faculty positions. 319 Four years after the gift was announced,
however, Yale returned the money, stating that the parties
could not negotiate acceptable terms for use of the gift. 320 The
gift, and its ultimate return, came to represent for some “the
hazards of accepting gifts with special conditions” 321 as well as
a failure of negotiation.322
Donor recognition is similarly a subject of negotiation.
When Edith and Henry Everett made a multimillion dollar
317. Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and
the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 154–55 (1977).
318. Jennifer Kaylin, Bass, Yale, and Western Civ., YALE ALUMNI MAG.
(Summer 1995), http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/95_07/bass
.html.
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also Jacques Steinberg, Yale Returns $20 Million to an Unhappy Patron, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/
15/us/yale-returns-20-million-to-an-unhappy-patron.html (“ To the best of my
knowledge, this is the largest gift that has ever been returned by an institution to a donor.”).
321. Kaylin, supra note 318.
322. Despite this cautionary tale, bargaining between institutions and donors over program control has continued. Controversy has, for example,
emerged over the desire of the Koch brothers to select faculty for the chairs
they endow based on political and philosophical preferences. Alex Pareene,
Right-Wing Billionaires Purchasing Own Professors, SALON (May 12, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/05/12/buying_professors_kochs; Kris Hundley, Billionaire’s Role in Hiring Decisions at Florida State University, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (May 10, 2011).
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pledge in 1996 to support the renovation of the Children’s Zoo
in Central Park, they bargained with the Wildlife Conservation
Society (WCS), the group overseeing the renovation. The Everetts wanted their name engraved in the stone archway at the
entrance to the zoo, erasing the name of the original donors.
The Everetts proposed replacing the engraving of the original
donors’ family name with small recognition plaques on either
side of the archway. The New York City Art Commission rejected this proposal and the Everetts withdrew their gift. 323
Once the gift has been paid in full or the trust created,
however, there is little legal opportunity for renegotiation. After the execution of the gift instrument, the assets are in care of
the institution and, under traditional law, the donor no longer
has standing, nor do her descendants.324 An institution may of
course return to a donor, while she is still living, or the donor’s
family, and ask permission to redirect funds or redraft the gift
terms. This was what Sweet Briar did in anticipation of closing
the college doors. Institutions engage in this type of outreach
even when they are not legally obligated to do so for public relations reasons and because of stewardship best practices. Bargaining once the gift has been completed is not, however, the
norm in charitable giving.
Moreover, many times there is no bargaining at all. In the
cases of the Corcoran or the Barnes Trust, the donors created
stand-alone institutions through testamentary trusts and there
were no other parties to check, counter, or decline the terms of
the trusts. John Langbein says of these situations: “the deal is
of the take-it-or-leave-it type, like the movie-theater ticket or
the vending-machine contract; there is no negotiating terms
with a decedent.” 325
Likewise, donors may create a testamentary trust or leave
a bequest to an already existing institution without giving any
notice to the institution. Donors have no obligation to bargain
or even notify an institution, and the norm historically has
been to create trusts or give gifts without much back and forth
323. The New York Times reported the retraction of the pledge. David W.
Dunlap, $3 Million Zoo Gift Revoked Because Plaque Is Too Small, N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/15/nyregion/3-million-zoo-gift
-revoked-because-plaque-is-too-small.html.
324. See Brody, supra note 27, at 1187 (“ The reason for disabling the donor
might be to recognize the completeness of the gift for public purposes.”). The
UTC, however, has been revised and now allows for settlor standing. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 405 (c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
325. Langbein, supra note 17, at 637.
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between donor and institution. For this reason, a number of institutions have implemented donor recognition societies for
those who plan their giving as a bequest in order to encourage
early communication about the gift. 326
Bargaining plays a different role in charitable giving than
it does in commercial contract law.327 Bargaining happens, to
be sure. Nevertheless, it is not usually the robust bargaining
imagined by contract law. And sometimes there is no bargaining at all. Consequently, presumptions about bargaining—and
standards based on these presumptions—should be recalibrated.
2. Public Benefit, Not Private Desire
Another factor that works in favor of a lower impracticability measure is the public benefit intervention. Nonprofit institutions must provide public benefit and contribute to the public
good, as mandated by the charitable purposes doctrine and tax
rules. 328 Donors are similarly circumscribed by the charitable
purposes doctrine in that their gifts must go to support these
same institutional objectives in order to receive tax deductions.
In other words, charitable giving is charitable because of the
public purpose it serves.
There is, therefore, a third party to the gift giving whose
benefit should be considered in the cy pres calculus—the public. 329 A charitable gift’s impracticability does not impact the
donor and institution alone; it also impacts the various publics
326. Stanford, for example, clearly states on its planned giving website: “If
you let Stanford know about your intended bequest or other planned gift, you
will be invited to enjoy special events and recognition as a member of the
Founding Grant Society.” Planned Giving, STANFORD UNIV., http://giving
.stanford.edu/planned-giving/overview/founding-grant-society (last visited Apr.
12, 2018). Columbia says: “Once you complete your estate plan, please let us
know. Columbia would like to thank you for your generosity by including you
in the 1754 Society.” Ways To Give: Planned Giving, COLUMBIA UNIV., http://
columbia.giftplans.org/index.php?cID=111&msect=1&create=1&mID=19 (last
visited Apr. 12, 2018).
327. See Brody, supra note 27, at 1258 (“[A]lthough a restricted gift constitutes an agreement between the donor and the charity, it is not merely a contract in the private law sense—rather, an unascertainable group constitutes
the true beneficiaries.”).
328. The IRS defines exempt or charitable purposes in Exempt Purposes—
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS (June 30, 2017), https://www.irs
.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internal
-revenue-code-section-501-c-3.
329. See Susan N. Gary, Restricted Charitable Gifts: Public Benefit, Public
Voice 21–24 (on file with author).
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who benefit from the gift and who are not party to any bargaining or negotiations around the terms of the gift. Accordingly,
public benefit should factor into cy pres considerations and any
increase or decrease to the public benefit should have a weight
equivalent to that placed on donor wishes. Public benefit is, of
course, not always easy to measure, and the relevant publics
can be many—with conflicting needs. 330 Nevertheless, the public has a continuing interest in receiving the benefit intended
by the gift, equal to or possibly greater than the donor’s interest in restricting gift usage. 331
In Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the terms of a gift to the city were
impracticable, allowing the city to override the donor conditions
to better serve “societal needs.” 332 The donor had left a bequest
funding the creation and maintenance of a garden and fountain
in the center of the city. Years later, the city developed “plans
for an economic revitalization project.” 333 The project was intended to “provide a new public beach, a lighthouse, a family
playground, a lodge, and an indoor/outdoor water park.” 334
Critical to the project’s implementation, however, was the relocation of the gardens and fountain in a different city park. The
court remarked:
Such a massive project should be planned in a way that maximizes its
potential, and when the location of the garden and fountain jeopardize that potential it becomes impractical not to relocate them. As a result, we think it would be impracticable to fund the garden at its original location. 335

Public benefit prevailed and the outcome underscored the importance of this third-party beneficiary to the gift “contract.”
Public benefit is a condition of the gift, a primary point of
charitable giving, and a predicate to the functioning of the nonprofit sector. This benefit should not be constrained because of
outdated or inefficient donor conditions. Put differently, cy pres
impracticability should not be so difficult a standard to reach
as to preclude the provisioning of public benefit.
330. See Tait, Publicity Rules for Public Trusts, supra note 68, at 421.
331. Moreover, donors have already received multiple benefits, financial
and other, from their donations. They have received benefits, and so should
the relevant public. See Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable Giving, supra
note 2, at 1667.
332. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 558 (Iowa 2007).
333. Id. at 551.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 557.
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C. USING PROPERTY: PRODUCTIVE USE AND REASONABLE
RETURN
Property rules offer a model for crafting an appropriate
measure for cy pres hardship. Property rules focus, like contract rules, on hardship and necessity, but property rules are
conceptually grounded in notions of productive property use
and reasonable return. These are concepts that transfer easily
into the cy pres context. To be sure, an institution can prove financial hardship through financial statements, budgeting
plans, and annual audits, as happened in the Fisk University
and Corcoran cases. Institutions should also, however, be able
to obtain cy pres relief by demonstrating that a restricted fund
is sitting unused or rarely used when the funds could be put to
more effective use. 336
For example, if a university fund dedicated to bringing in
visiting lecturers in a particularly narrow field is rarely used
because of the limiting conditions, an institution should be able
to expand the scope—perhaps to funding research more generally in the chosen field—thereby gaining more budgeting flexibility. An underutilized gift clearly contravenes the notion of
productive use and reasonable return. Likewise, an endowed
fund at a university that is restricted to providing scholarship
money to students from a particular, limited geographic region
and is rarely awarded could be modified in order to expand the
region and capture more students. Possible examples abound,
but the lesson is the same: expanding the scope of permissible
spending may help put the gift to productive use. Accordingly,
when an institution can demonstrate that a certain restricted
fund has not been used or used only very infrequently for a sustained length of time, then cy pres modifications should be
available in order to put the gift to productive use and obtain a
reasonable return.
In addition to measuring the use—or disuse—of a gift, the
concepts of productive use and reasonable return can be repurposed to apply when nonprofit institutions are not able to spend
gift funds in such a way as to create public benefit. A situation
involving “unreasonable” return might therefore occur when a
336. UPMIFA allows nonprofit institutions to modify restricted funds with
a value of $25,000 or less that are over twenty years old without obtaining judicial approval. The institution must only notify the state attorney general.
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/prudent%20mgt%20of%20
institutional%20funds/upmifa_final_06.pdf.
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gift that is restricted to a certain spending priority—a particular center or program that, while it still exists, no longer requires the same level of funding that it once did because it has
decreased its activities. Obtaining a reasonable return of the
gift might therefore require modifying the spending conditions
such that the scope, as well as the public benefit, could be expanded. The concept of reasonable return could be defined in
various ways in order to be useful in the cy pres context. What
is important is that institutions have the opportunity to
demonstrate why they are not getting a “reasonable return” on
the gift because of its restrictions and how they could improve
the return by slightly modifying the gift terms while still funding a similar project, department, or initiative.
In all of the scenarios above, institutions would not have to
prove financial insolvency or desperation. Instead, they could
obtain cy pres relief through a showing of how the restricted
funds are not being used at all, not being used productively, or
not being used to the institution’s reasonable advantage. This
would allow public charities to use more of their restricted gifts
fund, obtain increased flexibility in their financial operations,
and deter the problem of donor governance.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the vagaries of an unclear cy pres standard are
harming public charities, binding the fiduciaries in their governance role and impairing budgetary flexibility by leaving
outdated donor restrictions in place. The problem is that trust
law, in search of a consistent cy pres standard, is caught between two competing, conceptual goals: keeping promises and
meeting needs. The question for trust law is which path to follow. Trust law shares historical connections as well as conceptual underpinnings with both contract and property law, making them fitting lenses through which to examine and clarify
the contours of cy pres impracticability. Contract and trust law
share not only doctrinal architecture but also a particular theoretical mandate—promises must be kept. Property and trust
law share a deep conceptual foundation relating to asset management and productive property use. How, then, should trust
law navigate between these two poles? I propose that trust law
should use the contract criterion of financial hardship coupled
with a property measure of hardship, focusing on productive
use and reasonable return. This hybrid standard reflects the
dual nature of trust law, shedding light on how trust law is a
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composite of both contract and property. This standard is also
appropriate given the distinctive design and demands of charitable institutions. Ultimately, using contract and property to
build a stronger and more consistent cy pres standard not only
reveals trust law’s multifaceted nature but also the proper approach to regulating charitable giving in a modern landscape of
both promise and need.

